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Introduction 
Colonel F. Spencer Chapman's memoir, The Jungle is Neutral, charts the history of his 
experience in guerrilla warfare in South East Asia during the Second World War.1 In 
comparison to the 1950 edition, however, a reprint from 1957 omits Colonel Chapman's first 
chapter, 'In Search of War'.2 Within the first chapter, Colonel Chapman depicts his 
experiences in the first British guerrilla unit, 5th Scots Guards Ski Battalion and his subsequent 
involvement at the Special Training Centre, Lochailort, Scotland, from February to June 1940.3 The 
omission of Colonel Chapman's involvement with Britain's irregular warfare developments 
during 1940, although not totally representative of the Commando historiography, is indicative of 
the lack of academic attention it has received.4 Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to 
discuss the establishment and development of the Second World War Commando force from 
1940-1941. 
Historical narrative has come to occupy the majority of the Commando historiography; as Charles 
Messenger explained, 'an authenticity which I could never hope to reproduce in my own words is 
achieved through telling a story.0 Academically, secondary sources have focused on the Royal 
Marine Commandos, with the service adopting 'Commando' duties following the Second World 
War, thus, post-war interest has focused on the Royal Marines.6  For example, Major-General J. 
Thompson's, The Royal Marines: From Sea Soldiers -to a Special Force, and J. Parker's, Royal 
Marines Commandos: The Inside Story of a Force for the Future offer a chronological history of the 
Royal Marines, from their formation by King 
 
1 The Jungle is Neutral, ed. Colonel Spencer Chapman (London: Corgi Books, 1957)  
2 The Jungle is Neutral, ed. Colonel Spencer Chapman (London: Corgi Books, 1957) see also The Jungle is Neutral ed. 
Colonel Spencer Chapman (London: The Reprint Society London, 1950), pp 13-20  
3 The Jungle is Neutral, ed. Colonel Spencer Chapman (London: The Reprint Society London, 1950), pp 13-20 
4 The Jungle is Neutral, ed. Colonel Spencer Chapman (London: Corgi Books, 1957)  
5 C. Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, (London: Grafton Books, 1991), pp13 
6 National Archives PRO CAB 106/7, Colonel Pollock, Commando Group see also National Archives PRO V699, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Clarke, The Start of 'Commandos 
Charles II on 28th October 1664, to present day operations in Afghanistan.7 R. Neilland's, 
By Sea and Land: The Story of the Royal Marine Commandos, and Sir R. B. Lockhart's, The 
Marines Were There, again both narrate the history of the Royal Marine Commandos who 
were established in 1942, two years after the Army Commandos during the Second World 
War.8  
The Special Forces' historiography has also focused on the origins of the Special Air 
Service (SAS).9 In particular, founding members of the SAS, D. Stirling and B. Mayne 
have had biographies published.10 Stirling and Mayne were originally in the Commandos 
and it was this experience that gave them the skills that enabled them to develop the SAS.11 
H. Ross's, Paddy Mayne, attempts to discuss the early Commandos and SAS 
simultaneously, demonstrating 'the often blurred dividing line between Commandos per se 
and other Special Forces.'12 Therefore, this thesis recognizes the need for a precise focus on 
the Army Commandos from 1940-1941 in order to maintain academic focus and strong 
analysis. This problem is most marked in P. Warner's,. Secret Forces of World WarII.13 
Warner discusses numerous Special Forces that operated during the Second World War, 
with no discernable connections being made between the various forces which results in a 
disjointed and random 
7 Thompson, The Royal Marines: From Sea Soldiers to Special Force, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2000). Parker, Royal 
Marines Commandos: The Inside Story of a Force for the Future, (Chatham: Headline Group, 2007) 
8 R. Neillands, By Sea and Land: The Story of the Royal Marine Commandos, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 
2004) see also Sir R. B. Lockhart, The Marines Were There, (Dublin: Panther Books, 1957) see also National Archives PRO 
CAB 106/7, Colonel Pollock, Commando Group 
9 G. Mortimer, Stirlings Men: The Inside History of the SAS in World War II, (Michigan: Phoenix Publishing, 2005) see also 
G. Stevens, The Originals: The Secret History of the SAS in their Own Words, (London: Ebury Press, 2006) 
10 A. Hoe, David Stirling: The Authorised Biography of the Founder of the SAS, (USA: Time Warner, 1994), see H. Ross., 
Paddy Mayne, (Stroud: History Press, 2008) see also R. Bradford & M. Dillon, Rogue Warrior of the SAS: The Blair 
Mayne.Legend, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2003)  
11 G. Stevens, The Originals: The Secret History of the SAS in their Own Words, (London: Ebury Press, 2006), see also G. 
Mortimer, Sterlings Men: The Inside History of the SAS in World War II, (Michigan: 2005) see also H. Ross, Paddy Mayne, 
(Stroud: History Press, 2008), pp31-34  
12 H. Ross, Paddy Mqyne, (Stroud: History Press, 2008), pp21-58, see also C. Messenger, The Commandos (London: Grafton 
Books, 1991), pp13  
13 P. Warner, Secret Forces of World War II, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004) 
study.14 Consequently, to avoid producing an unwieldy study this dissertation will focus 
specifically on the establishment and development of the Army Commandos from 1940-1941. 
The study of the development of the Army Commandos from 1940-1941, as far as this 
research project can discern, has received little academic attention. A. Mallinson's 
meta-narrative, The Making of the British Army: From the English Civil War to War on Terror, 
makes no reference to the formation of the Commandos.15 However, specific work oil the Army 
Commandos has been written, for example, J. Ladd's, Commandos and Rangers of World War 
II, published in 1978, provides an extensive narrative from 1940-1945, but the dual study of 
both Commandos and American Rangers disjoints Ladd's narrative, similar to P. Warner's, 
Secret Forces of World War II.16 C. Messenger's, The Commandos 1940-1946, published in 1991, 
is both accurate and well structured in its approach to charting the Second World War 
Commando, although a discussion of 1940-1941 is truncated into the first two chapters.17 No 
academic texts of a comparable focus to Messenger's, The Commandos 1940-1946, could be 
found in, the interest of this study, since its publication nearly twenty years ago (1991).18 It may 
be suggested that a broad Commando narrative has not entered the historiography since 1991 
because, barring the period of 1940-1941, Messenger's book produced a thorough 
investigation.19 
In support of this, recent secondary sources entering the historiography have become more 
specific. For example, N. Cherry's, Striking Back: Britain's Airborne and Commando Raids 
1940-42, studies raiding operations during the aforementioned period, although both 
 
14 P. Warner, Secret Forces of World War II, (Bamsley: Pen & Sword, 2004) 
15 A. Mallinson, The Making of the British Army: From the English Civil War to War on Terror, (London: 
Bantam Press, 2009) 
16 J. D. Ladd, Commandos and Rangers of World War II, (London: Macdonalds and Jane, 1978) see also P. 
Warner, Secret Forces of World War II, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004)  
17 C. Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, (London: GraftonBooks, 1991)  
18 ibid  
19 ibid 
Airborne and Commando forces have to be examined to constitute enough material to justify a 
book.20 Cherry's work focuses on the period of 1940-1942, but the initial formation of the 
Commandos in 1940 is condensed into the introduction of his text.21 Thus, again 
demonstrating the historiographies' lack of material discussing the establishment and 
development of the Commandos from 1940-1941.22 
Less recent texts such as, Commando Attack by G. Holman, first published in 1942, do, 
however, cover the Commando establishment and development through 1940-1941, 
especially in regard to training.23 Holman's work in parts is comparable to War Office 
propaganda rather than accurate historical commentary, asking, three years before the 
conclusion of the War, presumptive questions such as, 'Why did the Commandos succeed?'24 
Commando Country by S. Allan is the only secondary source that this dissertation could 
locate that addresses the development of training in the West of Scotland, offering a 
comprehensive historical narrative; it is hoped that this text can be of value in addressing the 
development of training from 1940-1941.25 
The recent entry of more focused texts into the historiography has also seen literature commit to 
analysis of a single Commando action, rather than a period of time. For example, the raid on St 
Nazaire is covered by the following: K. Ford's, St Nazaire: The Great Commando Raid, J. 
Dorrain, Saint-Nazaire: Operation Chariot- 1942, and J. Cooksey's, Operation Chariot: The 
Raid on St Nazaire.26 In respect of this dissertation, these three examples fail to provide 
 
20 N. Cherry, Striking Back: Britain's Airborne and Commando Raids 1940-42, (Solihill: Helion & Company 
Ltd, 2009) 
21 ibid ppl9-40 
22 ibid. 
23 G. Holman, Commando Attack, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1942) 
24 ibid 
25 S. Allan, Commando Country, (Edinburgh: National Museums of Scotland, 2007) 
26 K. Ford, St Nazaire 1942: The Great Commando Raid, (Kent: Osprey Publishing, 2001) see also J. Dorrain, 
Saint-Nazaire: Operation Chariot-1942, (Bamsley: Pan & Sword, 2006), J. Cooksey, Operation Chariot: 
The Raid on St Nazaire, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2005) 
adequate context due to their concise structure, reflecting the requirement for this study to 
cover a period that allows for context to be analysed and criticized.27 
Research of secondary sources, therefore, presents the concept behind this enquiry into the 
establishment and development of the Army Commandos from 1940-1941. The historiography 
contains literature that is either very broad in its chronology and force focus, or is more precise 
in its approach, yet has not adequately addressed the establishment and development of the 
Commandos between 1940-1941. It was therefore felt that there was a valid research project to 
be undertaken. 
There are a number of published primary source materials which discuss the. establishment and 
development of the Commandos from 1940-1941. J. Dunning's, The British Commando: The 
Origins and Special Training of an Elite Unit, details the training developments and the 
individuals involved.28 Brigadier Durnford Slater's, Commando: Memoirs of a Fighting 
Commando in World War Two, is unique in that it discusses the early operations of the 
Commandos in 1940 and the early adoptions of the force which is unique in the 
historiography.29 Brigadier Durnford Slater served with the Commandos from their original 
formation in 1940 until 1945, thus his memoirs give a view of the progression and 
development of the force with a certain degree of criticism and insight.30 
In respect of this dissertation, a substantial part of unpublished primary source material was 
researched at The National Archives, Kew. The requirements of this dissertation have meant at 
official correspondence between Churchill and his Aids was of interest as they 
 
27K. Ford, St Nazaire 1942: The Great Commando Raid, (Kent: Osprey Publishing, 2001) see also J. Dorrain, 
Saint-Nazaire: Operation Chariot-1942, (Barnsley: Pan & Sword, 2006), J. Cooksey, Operation Chariot: 
The Raid on St Nazaire, (Bamsley: Pen & Sword, 2005)  
28 The British Commando: The Origins and Special Training of an Elite Unit, ed. J. Dunning (Colorado: 
Paladin, 2000) 
29 Commando: Memoirs of a Fighting Commando in World War Two, ed. Brigadier J. Durnford-Slater, 
(London: Greenhill Books, 2002)  
30 ibid 
predominantly communicate the administrative problems of the Commandos within the 
higher echelons of Government and the Military.31 High ranking Officers involved with the early 
Commando establishment through to N. C. O's have also left official accounts of their 
experiences.32 Commando Unit Diaries also provide a narration of the training, socializing and 
operations, but the reliability of these sources has, at times, been subject to enquiry as the 
handwriting of the entries regularly changes.33 
Also of great value are records of official Army meetings on the Independent Companies and the 
early Commandos.34 The historiography of the Independent Companies has no secondary sources 
that could be located for the purpose of this study. This may be due to their brief existence 
between April and October 1940 and their lack of utilization during that time.35 Although, 
official correspondence, Unit Diaries and Army meeting minutes referring to the early 
development of the Independent Companies were available at the National Archives, Kew, 
allowing for an important aspect of this study to be critically covered.36 
The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London, has also been used to 
research the Army Commandos. Specifically the unpublished primary source material from 
Major-General Laycock, who archived application forms, correspondence and early plans for the 
Commandos in 1940-1941 as well as his personal essays on 'discipline' all of which were 
 
31 National Archives PRO PREM 3/103/1, Organization and Equipment Aug-Sep 1940 see also National 
Archives PRO PREM 3/330/9, Prime Minister's Office: Operational Correspondence and Papers  
32 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Early History of Combined Operations: notes, memoranda and 
interviews with Senior Officers 
33 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/1134, The Training of Commandos in Scotland during the late War, 4 Oct. 
1915, see also National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Clarke, 'The Start of 
Commandos' see also National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Early history of Combined Operations: notes, 
memoranda and interviews by Senior Officer see also National Archives PRO WO 218/12, Major J. R. 
Paterson, Diary No 4 Independent Company 
34 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Early history of Combined Operations: notes, memoranda and 
interviews by Senior Office 
35 National Archives PRO DEFE 211134, Minute Sheet dated 24 Sept. 1945. 
36 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization 
of an infantry battalion see Appendix I see also National Archives PRO WO 218/12, Major J. R. Paterson, 
Diary No 4 Independent Company 
located in this archive.37 Specifically, the application forms and correspondence in relation to this 
study are of research value as no such material could be found at the National Archives, Kew for 
the purpose of this study. 
Online resources have provided access to primary source material. The Commando Veterans 
Association website allows for access to unpublished memoirs of men who were involved with 
Commandos from 1940-1941.38 The 'War Experience' website contains a memoir of Parson who 
served with the Independent Companies in Norway, 1940.39 Parson's memoir is of value because 
he was a private soldier, whereas all of the official Army Records from the National Archives, 
Kew are written by Officers or Non- Commissioned Officers.40 
An interview with a Captain T. Hughes, 47 Commando, Royal Marines has also been 
included.41 However, this research study is to focus on the establishment and development of 
Army Commandos from 1940-1941. The Royal Marines did not take on Commando until 1942, 
but it is hoped that some degree of value can be derived from the interview for the purpose of this 
thesis. 
Dissertation structure is as follows. Chapter One will critically assess the beginnings of the use 
irregular warfare, debating the events and importance of the Independent companies 
operations in Norway. Chapter Two will critique Britain's Commando origins 
 
37 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK, The Papers of Major-General Laycock  
38 Veterans Association, The Memories of Sergeant John Huntington as related to John Mewett Available: 
http://www.commandoveterans.org/site/images/stories/Media/The%20Memories%20of%20Sgt%20John%2
2Huntingdon.pdf Accessed 12/08/10 
39 G. Parson, ‘The Norway Campaign' in War-Experience [Online], Available: 
http://www.war-experience.org/hisotery/keyaspects/norway1940/pagethree.asp. Accessed: 10/08/10  
40 G. Parson, ‘The Norway Campaign' in War-Experience [Online], Available: 
http://www.war-experience.org/hisotery/keyaspects/norway1940/pagethree.asp. Accessed: 10/08/10 
41 National Archives PRO WO 260/3, Headquarters for SCISSORS (Irregular Operations by Independent 
companies on Norwegian Coast) see also National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Early History of Combined 
Operations, notes, memoranda and Interviews by Senior Officers 
T. Hughes, (2010) Discussion of 47 Commando Royal Marines, [Interview], Rotherham, Thomas Lea, see 
Appendix IX 
8 
demographical make-up of the force with, analysis of the Commandos' first raids 
including Chapter Two.  Chapter Three aims to analyse the development of early 
commando training establishments, progressing into an investigation of life in early 
commando units and the issues that faced the force until the end of 1941, Finally, the 
conclusion will seek to critically evaluate the study and its outcomes. 
Chapter One- The Independent Companies 
10 
During the early months of 1940, the British public's thoughts had turned towards the fate of the 
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France.1 Efforts to prepare Britain for an imminent German 
invasion were expressed by Winston Churchill in his defiantly optimistic 'Their Finest Hour' 
speech, delivered to the House of Commons on 18th June 1940: 
'What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of 
Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. 
Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our Institutions and our 
Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler 
knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the war.'2 
Churchill's memoirs, convey the impression that in June 1940 Britain was on the defensive, with a 
Government resigned to waiting for the Luftwaffe to clear the way for a Nazi invasion, entitled 
'Operation Sea Lion'.3 To a certain extent this is true; the defensive actions of the Royal Air Force 
during the Battle of Britain were a pivotal moment for Britain's survival in the Second World War.4 
The 'Battle of France' during May and June 1940 was not, however, the only British offensive 
against the Nazis.5 Army records show that a month before Dunkirk on 4th April 1940, the General 
Staff met 'to consider the organization of a Special Battalion' to mount offensive operations in 
Bodo, Norway, to be known as Operation SCISSORS.' (see Appendix I).6 
It shall be argued, in being the first operational irregular unit, the 'Independent Companies' helped 
to shape the future development of the Commandos.7 This evidence questions N. Cherry's 
conclusions in Striking Back: Britain's Airborne and Commando Raids 1940-42, that plans for the 
 
1 The Second World War, ed. W. L. S Churchill (London: Pimilco, 2002), pp265- 74 
2 W. L. S. Churchill, 'Their Finest Hour' on 19 June. 1940., The Churchill Centre and Museum at the 
Churchill War Rooms, London, [Online] Available: http 
://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-l/1940-finest-hour/122-their-finest-hour, 
Accessed: 08/08/10 
3 The Second World War, ed. W. L. S. Churchill (London: Pimilco, 2002), pp343-66  
4 The Second World War, ed. W. L. S. Churchill (London: Pimilco, 2002), pp352 
5 R. A. C. Parker, The Second World War: A Short History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp38-9 
6 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization 
of infantry battalion see Appendix I 
7 National Archhives PRO PREM 3/103/1, letter from Eden to Churchill, 8 Sept. 1940. 
11 
irregular units began on '4th June which was actually the last day of the Dunkirk evacuation.'8 
However, evidence from the meeting held on 4th April 1940, between the Chiefs of Staff, defined 
the purpose of the new Special Infantry Battalion as follows: 
'The unit to be capable of fighting as a battalion but should be so organized that companies 
and platoons can operate independently for a limited period.'9 
The parameters set above would continue to dictate the requirements of the Commandos as 
documented in 'Commando Training Instructions No. 1' that state '...units equivalent in strength to 
a weak battalion and operate independently...' (see Appendix II).10 Importantly the ability to 
'operate independently for a limited period' can be interpreted as an allocation of the first raiding 
duties being given to the Independent Companies which would come to inform the main aim of the 
Commandos 'smash and grab' tactics.11 The record continues: 
'Possible Theatres of War- Scandinavia and Finland or the Balkans. 
Mobility- The unit should be capable of long moves over flat country and of shorter moves 
over mountainous country. 
Type of Enemy- 1st Class.  
Date by which required- As early as possible.'12 
With the surrender of Finland on 12th March 1940, the General Staff were obviously aware of the 
nature of the Nazi threat and what was required and where to neutralize the threat to 
 
8 N. Cherry, Striking Back: Britain's Airborne and Commando Raids 1940- 42, (England: Helion & Company, 
2009, pp 22 see also National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to 
consider the organization of special infantry battalion, see Appendix I  
9 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4April. 1940. to consider the organization of 
Special infantry battalion, see Appendix I 
10 National Archives PRO WO 33/1669, Commando Training Instruction No1, 15. Aug. 1940 see Appendix II 
11 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization 
of special infantry battalion, see Appendix I see also National Archives PRO WO 33/1669, Commando 
Training Instruction No1, 15. Aug. 1940, see Appendix II 
12 National  Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the 
organization of special infantry battalion see Appendix I 
12 
Britain.13 Brigadier A. E. Nye immediately references '5th Battalion Scots Guards' who, 
although it is not disclosed in the meeting, were raised as an irregular force to attack Finland in 
February 1940.14 Further research into 5th Battalion the Scots Guards Ski Battalion revealed 
that a report had been requested by the Headquarters Brigade of Guards, from the Colonel 
commanding the Battalion, which was received on 3rd April 1940.15 The evidence contained in 
the report suggests how unprepared Britain was for arctic warfare; the report concludes that the 
failure of the Battalion was due to the fact that 'No study had been made of this type of warfare by 
the British Army.' (see Appendix III)16 
jfeex Brigadier A. E. Nye had been sent a copy of the report is not stated, yet in citing 5th Battalion 
Scots Guards he was aware of the parallels with regard to the requirements of the Independent 
Companies.17 Evidence from the meeting held on 4th April 1940, to meet the German threat in 
Scandinavia, suggests an ignorance amongst the Chiefs of Staff with regard to the problems that 
faced 5th Battalion Scots Guards Ski Battalion, which had been raised specially for arctic 
warfare, but had failed to mobilize due to a poor level of training.18 Moreover, on 17th April 
1940 evidence from an Army meeting between the Chiefs of Staff gives the establishment of an 
exact plan for the formation of the Independent Companies and from where the men were to be 
taken (see Appendix IV):19 
13 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization of a special 
infantry battalion, see Appendix I see also R. A.C. Parker, The Second World War: A Short History, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), pp25 
14 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization of a special 
infantry battalion see Appendix I see also, The British Commandos: The Origins and Special Training of an Elite Unit ed. 
J. Dunning (Colorado: Paladin Press, 2000), pp&8-9 
15 National Archives PRO WO 166/4110, Formation of 5th Battalion Scots Guards see Appendix III 
16 ibid 
17 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization 
of  a special infantry battalion see Appendix I see also National Archives PRO WO 166/4110, Formation of 
5th Scots Guards see Appendix III 
18 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization 
of a special infantry battalion see Appendix I see also National Archives PRO WO 166/4110, Formation of 
5th Scots Guards see Appendix III 
19 National Archives PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940. to consider the formation of 
special infantry and independent companies see Appendix IV 
13 
The following programme was agreed:- 
(a) Nol Independent Company from 52 Division :- 
to be raised by                22 April 
to be ready to move           27/28 April 
(b)One Independent Company from 1 London Div. 
One Independent Company from 18 Div.  
W.O. Conference 
D.D.R.O. with G.S.os.I. 18 April 
Men to be collected by 24 April 
Commanding offices to W.O.  25 April 
To complete mobilization by  29 April 
To be available to move  30 April 
 (c) One Independent Company from each of  54  Div.,  
55 Div. and 56 Div. as in (b) except:- 
Men to be collected by 26 April 
To complete mobilization by  1 May 
To be available to move  2 May 
(d) Remaining four Independent Companies to be 
raised one each from 53, 9, 38 and 15 Divisions B  
on a similar programme to (b) but probably five 
days later, i.e to be available to move 5 May.'20 
Source documents the variety of recruits ranging from six different divisions (1 London, 52, 
54, 55, 56).21 It may be suggested that recruitment was spread over such a large number 
of men because of the imminent requirements of the B. E. F., a point supported by the 
Chiefs of Staff stating 'that B. E. F. should not be asked to provide any men...'22 The 
statement referring to the B. E. F further indicates the reason why, by 17th April 1940, 
the Independent Companies had 'no signals or sappers available to them' despite the 
Chiefs of Staff stating on 4th April 1940, 'that signallers would be required' and Royal 
Engineers 
20 National Archives PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940. to consider the formation of 
independent companies see Appendix IV 
21 ibid 
22 ibid 
14 
would carry out 'hasty demolition'.23 As Captain B. G. Pugh documented of his Companies' 
formation, No 2 Independent Company, there was both a wide selection of backgrounds and 
k1 • • 
as can be noted no signallers or engineers: 
'This Company was formed from the 53rd Welsh Division, in April 1940, and 
mustered at Ballykinler in Northern Ireland. The Company was composed of men 
from the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the South Wales Borderers, the Welsh Regiment and the 
Kings Shropshire Light Infantry.'24 
The War Office requirement for 'specially fit and intelligent trained soldiers', also resulted in oad 
cross section of divisions and regiments being tapped to recruit the correct type of i.25 To 
achieve this the Independent Companies were not stringently screened to raise the of men required; 
in evidence of this the War Office correspondence stated that an aim of nil returns will be rendered 
if applicable.'26 
However, as the Chiefs of Staff meeting from 17th April 1940 expresses, the Independent 
Companies were to be formed and battle ready within one week.27 No 1 Independent 
Company was to be raised on 22nd April 1940 and operational by 27th/28th  April 1940.28 This 
statement contradicts the Chiefs of Staff’s requirements for men to be 'carefully handpicked', 
especially fit and intelligent trained soldiers...' as there is no allocation within this for a 
training schedule to prepare the men to fulfil the role required of them.29 The Chiefs of Staff, 
therefore, contradicted themselves with regards to the level which men would 
 
23 National Archives PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940 to consider the formation of 
independent companies see Appendix IV see also National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting 
held 1940 to consider the organization of special infantry battalion see Appendix I  
24 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 'No2 Independent Company' Account by Captain B. G. Pugh  
25 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization 
of special infantry battalion see Appendix I 
26 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Urgent Postal Telegram 22 April. 1940. 
27 National Archives PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940. to consider the formation of 
independent companies see Appendix IV 
28 ibid 
29 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization 
of  special infantry battalion see Appendix I see also National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting 
held on 17 April 1940 to consider the formation of independent Companies see Appendix IV 
15 
be trained.30 Evidence to support this is stated by the Deputy Director of Military Intelligence 
(D.D.M.I.), Brigadier the Honourable E. H. Wyndham, in the meeting held on the 17th April 
1940:31 
D.D.M.I. CO) pointed out that these companies were wanted as early as possible, and it 
would hardly be possible to spare the time for this training'32 
Furthermore, Brigadier A. E. Nye (D. D. S. D) comments that the training of the Divisions, which 
the Independent Companies were to recruit from, was 'not so high' and suggests the 
establishment of a 'training centre'.33 However, as previously mentioned on the 4th April 1940, 
Brigadier A. E. Nye (D. D. S. D) had cited 5th Battalion the Scots Guards which, in contrast to 
the Independent Companies, had followed a training regime but had found that 'the Battalion 
was quite untrained in the tactics of arctic warfare...' with only twenty five percent able to ski 
and that a complete lack of research into the skills required had been undertaken.34 Research 
also suggests that beyond a lack of preparation and rushed mobilization timelines, even had 
the Independent Companies been allocated, time to train,  a training doctrine was yet to be 
established.35 This is supported by evidence that documents first training instructions for the 
Independent Companies were not issued by the War Office until 20th August 1940, nearly five 
months later (see Appendix V).36 
 
30 National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940. to consider the formation of 
Independent Companies see Appendix IV  
31 Military Intelligence Branch 9, War Office' in Your Archives- delivered by the National Archives [Online]. 
Available: 
http://yourarchives.nationalarchives.gov.uk/index.php?title=Military_Intelligence_branch_9_War_Office, 
Accessed: 12/08/10  
32 National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940. to consider the formation of  
Independent Companies sec Appendix IV sec also National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held 
17 April 1940. to consider the formation of Independent Companies see Appendix IV 
33 National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940. to consider the formation of 
Independent Companies see Appendix IV 
34 National Archives PRO WO 166/4110, Formation of 5th Battalion Scots Guards see Appendix III  
35 National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940. to consider the formation of 
Independent Companies see Appendix IV 
36 National Archive PRO WO 33/1669, Independent Company Training Instruction No.l, 20 Aug. 1940. see ; 
Appendix V National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940. to consider the 
formation of Independent Companies see Appendix IV 
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The allocation of equipment for the Independent Companies further reflects the makeshift 
nature of the force and supports the notion that Britain was making a reactive rather than 
proactive irregular formation.37 A quantitative review of the allocation of weaponry, is in stark 
contrast to the rhetoric advocated by the War Office in an urgent postal telegram sent on 22 April 
to the relevant Divisions, stating: 
'3. War Equipment, (a) 
Personal. 
(i) Personnel will be armed, clothed and equipped to normal active service 
scales of arms, clothing and equipment, (including respirators, anti-gas...)'38 
It is suggested that the men of the Independent Companies were to receive the standard 
equipment quota, despite the Chiefs of Staff already suggesting that the geographical areas the 
men were to operate in were, 'Scandinavia and Finland or the Balkans.'3   However, 
research shows that a day later, on 23rd April 1940, a private letter that has neither its author or its 
recipient named, documented the reality of the equipment situation with regard to the Independent 
Companies: 
'It will not be possible to obtain gangster guns for 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 Independent Coys. It is 
very doubtful whether any will be available for Nos 2, 6, 7 and 9 Coys. Following that 
Pistols are also not available. Sniper Rifles are being issued at the rate of 1 per guerrilla 
section. 
In my view of the above it will be necessary to modify the scale of equipment for each section 
to the following:- 
 
 1 Officer Pistol 
2 N.C.Os. Rifles 
1 Pte  Sniper Rifle 
   
37 National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Authorless letter' Establishment of Independent Companies' 
38 National Archive PRO WO 260/32, Urgent Postal Telegram 22 April. 1940. 
39 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940, to consider the organization 
of a special infantry battalion see Appendix I 
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1 Pte Bren Gun and Pistol 
IPte Pistol (No 2 of Bren gun) 
8 Pte Rifles'40 
Evidence shows that in a troop of fourteen men both the Officer in Command and second i man 
on the Bren gun were not to be issued with a rifle.41 Even this poor outlook for the Independent 
Companies' equipment may have been optimistic. On review of the War Establishment's 
allocation of weapons and ammunition, data states that the Independent Companies were to be 
allocated two hundred and two 303-inch rifles (see Appendix VI).42 The same document 
proceeds to state that each Independent Company will number two hundred and eighty nine 
for all ranks, a shortfall of eighty-seven if each man were to be issued with a standard British 
Army Rifle.43 However, the War Office seems to compensate for this in an itinerary requesting, 
'Other, ranks equipped -with rifles will bring these with from their units', further evidence 
suggesting the shortfall in equipment for the dent Companies.44 
To compound the shortfall in standard issue arms, the Chiefs of Staff suggested that the 
Independent Companies were to operate in 'Scandinavia and Finland or the Balkans.'45 
Correspondence from the War Office, however, stated, '...special clothing was not required after 1 
May' and, 'There were only sufficient rucksacks... for two companies.'46 The shortfall of weaponry 
was matched, therefore,  by a similar shortfall in suitable clothing and 
 
40 National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Authorless letter 'Ref Establishment of Independent Companies', 23 June 
1940. 
41 National Archives PRO WO 260/3, 'An Independent Company' War Establishment Amendment No.2 see 
Appendix VI 
42 ibid 
43 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, 'Urgent Postal Telegram' War Office, 22 April.1940. 
44 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization of 
a special infantry battalion see Appendix I 
45 National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17April. 1940. to consider the formation of 
Independent Companies see Appendix IV 
46 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the mobilization 
of special infantry battalion see Appendix I 
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equipment, all of which is contrary to the Chiefs of Staffs agreement that 'the provision of 
equipment would not be a limiting factor in raising the special battalion.'47 Furthermore, the 
previously mentioned 5th Scots Guards Ski Battalion which had been issued with the correct 
equipment for arctic conditions, had been disbanded because 'Having been formed in a hurry the 
Battalion was quite untrained... in the use of its special equipment.'48 This is further evidence 
of how unprepared the Independent Companies were with regard to the training and equipment 
provided.49 
Thus, this evidence supports Messenger's suggestion of the 'muddled' nature of early 
operations.50 On receiving his first mission, the Commanding Officer of No 4 Independent 
Company, J.R. Paterson, visited the War Office and was given a collection of maps 'which 
consisted of an illustrated guide to the beauty of Norway' from which he was to plan his 
companies’ first attack on Bodo, Norway.51 Messenger's analysis is supported by further 
evidence presented by the hand drawn map in Appendix VII, which was used for planning the 
Independent Companies' operation in Bodo, Norway.52 This map is evidence of the lack of 
military intelligence and planning; Commanding Officers would not have been able to 
accurately plan operations because of the estimated heights and depressions of mountains and 
highly gauged locations of rivers and forest.53 
Norway had originally prevented Britain from coming to the aid of Finland in 1939 by 
forbidding the British Expeditionary Force passage.54 The allocation of the Independent 
 
47 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization 
of a special infantry battalion see Appendix I , 
48 National Archives PRO WO 166/4110, Formation of 5th Battalion Scots Guards see Appendix HI 
49 National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940. to consider the formation of 
Independent Companies see Appendix IV                                                                                         
50 C. Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, (London: Grafton Books, 1991), pp23 
51 ibid, p.23 
52 National Archive PRO DEFE 2/699, Hand Drawn Map from Operation SCISSORS see Appendix VII 
53 ibid 
54 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Major-General Lund D. S. O., R. A. (M. G. R. A. at H. F.), Interview 
8 
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Companies in the assault on Norway fitted the Independent Companies' remit, they were to 
operate in 'Scandinavia' and 'operate independently for limited periods.'55 On the other 
hand, evidence previously provided displays a force impeded by a severe lack of training 
and poorly supplied and would suggest ill-eqipped to fight against an enemy described by 
the Chiefs of Staff as '1st Class'.56 
 
On 10th May 1940, Independent Companies 1-5 embarked for Bodo, Norway arriving on 
the 3th May 1940.57 Before the Companies even saw action an administrative error with 
potentially lethal consequences had been made, described by Captain B. G. Pugh: 
 
'We stayed 4 or 5 days in the town [Bodo]. The spirits of the men were high; they 
were keen, eager and lighting fit. We remained there 4 days in order to unload the 
ROYAL ULSTERMAN, a matter of considerable difficulty for there were no 
derricks. She eventually sailed with some 40 tons of stores still on board. These 
included all the magazines for our Tommy guns. We had, therefore, the Tommy 
guns and the ammunition, and no means of introducing one to the other. All the 
field glasses were also left on the ship. The ship was bombed the day before she 
left... '58 
The above account, therefore, shows that what equipment the Independent Companies had 
acquired became ineffective.59 Furthermore, evidence suggests that the men of the 
independent Companies had not been trained to use the Tommy guns which had been 
issued, he first mention of automatic weapons training in No 4 Independent Company's 
diary is on 1st July 1940, '50% Coy introduced to automatic weapons', nearly two months 
after they died for Norway.60 
 
55 National Archives PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940. to consider the formation of  
independent Companies see Appendix IV 
56 National Archives PRO WO 260/3, 'An Independent Company' War Establishment Amendment No.2 see 
Appendix VI see also National Archives PRO WO 260/3, Authorless letter 'Ref Establishment of 
Independent Companies' see also National Archives PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April, 
1940. to consider the formation of Independent Companies see Appendix IV 
57 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 'No2 Independent Company' Account by Orderly Sergeant Brown. 
No. 115199/R.A. S. C. 
58 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 'No2 Independent Company' Account by Captain B. G. Pugh 
59 ibid 
60 National Archives PRO WO 218/12, Major J. R. Paterson, War Diary No 4 Independent Company 
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The Independent Companies had mixed encounters with the Norwegian population as they 
disliked the presence of the Allied troops, due to the bombing they attracted.61 Regardless of the 
War Office grading the enemy in Norway as '1st Class', their tactics and skill were still greatly 
miscalculated, as was the environment the men were to operate in.62 As Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor 
describes: 
'The country, which was wooded and very steep, was difficult to fight in and the German 
troops opposed to the Independent Companies of the Guards were very good Alpine 
Troops, especially skilled in the art of infiltration. Some of them consisted of men who had 
left Germany years before as refugees and established themselves in Norway...'63 
Unfortunately, supporting primary source evidence with regard to the German Wehrmacht or 
Waffen SS could not be resourced due to the majority of material being located at the Exhibits and 
Publications Divisions of the National Archives, Washington D. C. which for logistic and financial 
reasons have not been accessible.64 Despite the Independent Companies having -to face skilled 
'Alpine Troops' the General Staff had suggested that the 'ability to move in snow conditions at 
varying altitudes, but which will not require skill at mountaineering...' was needed.65 In contrast 
evidence shows, the men, many of whom, as Field-Marshall Auchinleck would later describe as, 
'distressingly young' and had 'never fired around in their lives', had never left the city as G. Parsons 
of No5 Independent Company explained: 
 
61 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 'No2 Independent Company' Account by Captain B. G. Pugh,    
62 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization of  
special infantry battalion see Appendix I 
63 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Account of 'Independent Companies' by Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor    
No2 Commando 
64 G. H. Stien, The Waffen SS: Hitler's Elite Guard at War 1939-1945, (Ithaca & London: Cornell University 
Press, 1966), pp xi 
65 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization of 
special infantry battalion see Appendix I   
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'We landed at this place Mojoen, and imagine how we felt when we saw a towering ice 
capped mountain in front of us standing about 2,000 feet high, we South London boys who 
had never seen a mountain before, most of us had never been to sea before.'66 
In consideration of the evidence presented thus far, suggesting a lack of weapons and 
equipment and poorly trained men, all of which were to face a highly effective enemy, the 
poor conduct of operations in Norway is, therefore, not surprising.67 Researched first hand 
accounts of Officers and N. C. O's offer no solid evidence of a cohesively planned 
offensive.68 Evidence to further support this by Captain McLean shows that one company of 
Scots Guards got lost for the entire three weeks of the expedition and saw no action at all, 
exemplifying the disorientated nature of the operation.69 Lieutenant-Colonel Gubbins, the man 
in overall command was provided with the following orders: 
'Your first task is to prevent the Germans occupying BODO, MO and MOSJOEN. 
This they may try to do by small parties landed from the sea or dropped by parachute. 
Later, the Germans may be expected to advance Northwards on MOSJOEN from the 
TRONDHEIM area via GRONG. You will ensure that all possible steps are taken by 
demolition and harrying tactics to impede any German advance along this route. Your 
companies operating in the area should not attempt to offer any prolonged resistance but 
should endeavour to maintain themselves on the flanks of the German forces and 
continue harrying tactics against their lines of communication.'70 
 
66 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 'Operations in Northern Norway: 13 May 1940 to 8 June 1940' 
Document dated Friday, 8 Oct. 1943. see also George Parsons, 'The Norway Campaign' in War-Experience 
[Online], Available: http://www.war-e7cperience.org/history/keyaspects/norwayl940/pagethree.asp. 
Accessed: 10/08/10 
67 National Archives PRO WO 260/3, 'An Independent Company' War Establishment Amendment No.2see 
also National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the 
organization of special infantry battalion see Appendix I see also National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 
Account of 'Independent Companies' by Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor No2 Commando 
68 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 'No 1 Independent Company' Interview with Captain McLean of the 
R. A. M. C see also National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Account of 'Independent Companies' by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor No2 Commando see also National Archives PRO WO 165/55, Norwegian 
Expeditionary Force Instructions dated 2 May. 1940. 
69 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 'No 1 Independent Company' Interview with Captain McLean of the 
R.A.M.C. 
70 National Archives PRO WO 165/55, Norwegian Expeditionary Force Instructions, 2 May. 1940. 
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The Norwegian Expeditionary Force Instructions are strategically ambiguous offering no 
cohesive plan between the separate Independent Companies over a large geographical area.71 
Furthermore, the instructions offer no clear military objective, only to 'maintain themselves' and 
to use 'harrying tactics', language that suggests the Independent Companies were on the back foot 
before they had even embarked.72 This point is further supported by the retreat of the Independent 
Companies, as described by Captain McLean, No 1 Independent Company: 
'In my opinion our withdrawal began to savour of a rout and I put this down to the fact 
that the Scots Guards had no proper control over their formations ... I should make it 
clear that the men were in no kind of a panic., but they did not know what to do, because 
no one had given them orders. I should say that the absence of orders during the 
withdrawal was most marked.'73 
The above account of Captain McLean supports previous evidence of poor organization and a lack 
of planning of the Independent Companies' operations in Norway. By 10th June 1940, all five 
Independent Companies were back in Scotland.74 The shortcomings of Independent Companies 
covered in this chapter are most marked by Captain McLean and Nol Independent 
Company, which alone accounted for twenty-five percent of all force casualties.75 However, 
it may be suggested that the casualties of the Norwegian campaign were not in vain. This is 
because Britain realized that she had neither the men nor the equipment to mount immediate 
operations on this scale, especially after Dunkirk, evident from the fact that a large scale force 
would not leave Britain until March 1941 in the form of 
 
71 National Archives PRO WO 165/55, Norwegian Expeditionary Force Instructions, 2 May. 1940. 
72National Archives PRO WO 165/55, Norwegian Expeditionary Force Instructions, 2 May. 1940. see also 
National Archives PRO WO 260/3, 'An Independent Company'. War Establishment Amendment No.2 see 
Appendix VI see also National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940. to 
consider 5 formation of Independent Companies see Appendix IV 
73 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 'No 1 Independent Company' Interview with Captain McLean of the 
R.A.M.C 
74 G. Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, (London: Grafton Books, 1991), pp25 
75 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 'No 1 Independent Company' Interview with Captain McLean of the 
R.A.M.C  
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LAYFORCE to the Middle East.76 Further evidence to support this is documented in the 
'Independent Company Training Instruction No.l' which states that from 20th August 1940 one 
of the roles of Independent Companies will be '...carrying out small raiding operations...'77 
Consequently, because of the shortfalls in equipment and trained men what would become 
known as 'pinprick raids' became the main focus of the Independent Companies' successors, the 
Commandos and, as Colonel Dudley Clarke later stated, 'the purpose for which they were created 
was solely to make cut and run raids.'78 On the other hand very little evidence suggests that 
the issue of equipment for the Independent Companies was immediately addressed.79 
Evidence shows that it was not until 3rd October 1940 that the Secretary of State for War, Anthony 
Eden, wrote to Winston Churchill, 'I have now made stringent enquiries into the matter of the 
equipment of the Independent Companies...'80 
On the other hand, the Unit Diary of No 4 Independent Company provides a consistent 
training and lecture schedule on survival, fitness and firearms, in an attempt to amend the 
mistakes of Norway.81 The regularity of the diary entries noting constant training-exercises, 
suggests that at least No 4 Independent Company felt that its force had permanence and an 
imminent operational requirement; as can be noted throughout this chapter, the difference 
between the rhetoric and reality was stark.82 
 
76 National Archives PRO PREM 3/330/1, letter from Ismay to Churchill, 14 June. 1940. see also National 
Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Brigadier Laycock, Early History: The Origin and Work of the Commandos 
77 National Archive PRO WO 33/1669, Independent Company Training Instruction No. 1,20 Aug. 1940. see 
Appendix V 
78 National Archives PRO PREM 3/330/9, letter from Churchill to Ismay, 23 July. 1940. see also National 
Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Brigadier Laycock, Early History: The Origin and Work of the Commandos 
79 National Archives PRO PREM 3/330/9, letter from Keyes to Churchill, 3 Oct. 1940. 
80 ibid 
81 National Archives PRO WO 218/12, Major J. R. Paterson, War Diary No 4 Independent Company 
82 ibid  
In conclusion, a study of the administrative problems facing the Independent Companies has 
been documented and assessed, as has the impact of these problems for the force in the 
theatre of war.83 Furthermore, the contradictions of the General Staffs views on equipment, 
training and recruitment have been criticized so as to present and expose how unprepared 
Britain was with regard to irregular warfare, a key aim of this chapter. The contextualization of 
the Independent Companies also allows for comparative analysis in both advancements and 
shortfalls within the Commandos' equipment, training and organization, which will form part of 
the critical analysis as this work develops. 
83 National Archive PRO WO 260/3, Notes on a meeting held on 17 April. 1940. to consider the formation of Independent 
Companies see Appendix IV see also National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 'No 1 Independent Company' Interview with 
Captain McLean of the R. A. M. C see also National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to 
consider the organization of special infantry battalion see Appendix 
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Chapter 2- Establishment of the Commandos 
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In response to the Independent Companies' actions in Norway, official British Army Records 
show General Auchinleck saw the operation as 'not reassuring for the future unless our 
methods of man-mastership and training for war can be made more realistic and less 
effeminate.'1 General Auchinleck's comments support the evidence that has been presented in 
Chapter One and the argument that the Chiefs of Staff and members of the Independent 
Companies were under-prepared because of lack of training, poor equipment and little prewar 
planning.2 Chapter Two will assess the steps taken to amend the shortcomings of the 
Independent Companies via the formation of the Commandos. Analysis of evidence will 
focus on the restructuring of recruitment and the requirements for joining the Commandos. 
Winston Churchill had exclaimed to the House of Commons on 4th June 1940 'We shall not be 
content with a defensive war.'3 On the same day he asked General Ismay for 'specially trained 
troops of the hunter class who can develop a reign of terror down the enemy coast', evidence of 
Churchill's belief in the need for an 'offensive' posture. 4 Evidence from the War Office in June 
1940 shows a huge increase in the volume of correspondence from the General Staff, propelled by 
Churchill, with regard to organizing 'irregular volunteers.'5 Furthermore, recognizing the 
complexities of the Commando's duties, Churchill appointed General A. Bourne, Royal 
Marine, to be 'Commander of Raiding Operations', a position which would 
1 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 'Operations in Northern Norway: 13 May 1940 to 8 June. 1940.' 
Document dated Friday, 8 Oct. 1943. 
2 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 'Operations in Northern Norway: 13 May. 1940. to 8 June. 1940.' Document 
dated Friday, 8 Oct. 1943. see also National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4th April, 1940, to 
consider the organization of special infantry battalion see Appendix I 
3 W. L. S. Churchill, Speech given to the House of Commons 'We Shall Fight on the Beaches', 4 June. 1940. Centre 
and Museum at the Churchill War Rooms London,[Online] Available: 
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/1940-finest-hour/128-we-shall-fight-on-t
he-beaches. 10/10/10. 
4 Commando: Memoirs of a Fighting Commando in World War Two, ed. Brigadier J. Dumford-Slater, (London: 
Greenhill Books, 2002), pp14 
5 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Memorandum by the D. M. O & P. on the Employment of Irregular 
Commandos now being raised in the United Kingdom, 13 June. 1940. see also National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, 
War Cabinet. Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes of Meeting to discuss 'Offensive Operations' held on 11 June. 
1940. at 10am see also 2/699, War Cabinet. Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes of Meeting to discuss 'Offensive 
Operations' held on 13 June. 1940. at 3pm 
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eventually develop into 'Commander of Combined Operations'.6 General A. Bourne's main role 
was to fulfil Churchill's demands that raiding operations would 'harass the enemy... to create 
material damage... from Northern Norway to the western limit of German-occupied France.' 
 
However, despite the increase in correspondence and debate over the formation of the 
Commandos, research suggests the lessons of poor training and equipment with regard to the 
Independent Companies had not been taken into account. For example, on 11th June, 1940, the 
Chief of the Air Staff, C. L. N. Newall explicitly informed Churchill that 'special equipment 
for offensive operations should be given a very high priority...'8 Evidence from four months 
later (October 1940) has the Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden informing Churchill, 
'I have now made stringent enquires into the matter of the equipment of the Independent 
Companies and Commandos...' suggesting that equipment and resources were still problematic, 
however the exact reason why is, unfortunately, not documented 9 
 
The 'offensive' spirit originated because as Colonel Dudley Clarke suggested, Britain's 
attention 'had been turned violently to the defence in exclusion of all else.'10 After the 
evacuation of Dunkirk the Chiefs of the General Staff immediately called for Colonel Dudley 
Clarke because he had been in charge, of a 'cloak and dagger' branch of the British 
Intelligence Service, known as M. O. 9.11 In an official Army interview Colonel Dudley 
6 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Major-General Alan Bourne, R.M., Early History of Combined 
Operations see also B. Fergusson, The Watery Maze, (London: Collins, 1961), pp16 
7 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Directive to A. G. B. Bourne on Raiding Operations, 13 June. 1940. 
8 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, letter from C. L. N. Newall (C.A.S.) to Churchill, 11 June. 1940. 
9 National Archives PRO PREM 3/103/1, letter from Eden to Churchill, October 1940 
10 The Second World War, ed. W. L. S. Churchill (London: Pimilco, 2002), pp 333- 337 see also Sir W.L.S. 
Churchill, Speech given to the House of Commons "Their Finest Hour', The Churchill Centre and Museum at 
the Churchill War Rooms London [Online], 
Available:http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/1940-finest-hour/
122-their-finest-hour, Accessed: 08/08/10 see also National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Dudley Clarke, "The Start of Commandos' 
11 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Early History, Interview with Colonel Dudley-Clarke see also 
National Archives Pro DEFE 2/699, Major-General O. M. Lund, D. S. O., R. A. (M. G. R. A. at H. F.), 
Interview 8 May. 
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Clarke indicates further the offensive motivation of the General Staff, requesting that 
immediate means be found, 'whereby the offensive spirit of the Army could be fostered until it 
was in a position to resume the offensive.'12 Evidence suggests that Colonel Dudley Clarke 
viewed irregular warfare as the correct offensive reaction to military isolation, stating: 
'Guerrilla warfare was always in fact the answer of the ill-equipped patriot in the face of a 
vaster though ponderous military machine; and that seemed to be exactly the position 
in which the British Army found itself in June 1940'13 
 
Thus, Colonel Dudley Clarke was tasked with creating the initial plans of the Commandos' 
as he had acted as a General Staff Officer in Palestine during the Arab Rebellion and had 
gained much experience during the conflict with regard to 'guerrilla' warfare.14 Colonel 
Dudley Clarke also referred to Deniz Reitz's memoir Commando: a Boer Journal of the 
Boer War, set against his own experience growing up as a child in South Africa considering 
the way in which 'guerrilla tactics by the Boer Kommandos snatched victory for many 
months from the British Army vastly superior in numbers and arms.'15 The Boer 
Kommandos mounted a campaign of 'hit and run' raids against the British in the 
Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), very similar to the 'nimble forces accustomed to work like 
packs of hounds' as asked for by Churchill.16 Churchill had fought against and been the 
prisoner of the Boer Kommandos and consequently developed an appreciation of irregular 
warfare, as evidenced from one of his memoirs Early Life: A Roving Commission details.17 
In contrast to the Boer Kommandos who 
12 1942. see also 'Military Intelligence Branch 9, War Office', Your Archives- delivered by the National 
Archives [Online],Available: 
mraichives.nationalarcMves.eov.uk/index.php?title=Military_Irjtelligence_branch_9._War_Office. 
Accessed: 12/08/10 
13 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Early History, Interview with Colonel Dudley-Clarke  
14 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Clarke, The Start of Commandos'  
15 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Clarke, 'The Start of Commandos' see 
also National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Early History, Interview with Colonel Dudley-Clarke, Colonel 
Dudley Clarke, Seven Assignments, (London: John Cape, 1948), pp207  
16 Commando: a Boer journal of the Boer War, ed. D. Reitz (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1929) see also 
National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Lieutenant-Colonel Dudley Clarke, 'The Start of 'Commandos' 
National Archives PRO PREM 3/103/1, letter from Churchill to Eden, 25 Aug. 1940.  
17 Early Life: A Roving Commission, ed. W. L. S. Churchill (London: McMillan, 1944), pp243-312 
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recruited men from the local neighbourhood, the British Commandos originally sourced men from 
the regular Army as the proceeding research shows.18 
The exact date that Commando recruitment began is a point of contention. Major-General 
Laycock recalls that 'the word "Commando" being used immediately after the disbanding of the 
Independent Companies' in October/ November 1940.19 Major-General Laycock referred to the 
creation of the Special Service Battalion, whereby the Commandos and Independent Companies’ 
were merged into one force.20 Official records show that recruitment paperwork for the 
Commandos was distributed to designated battalions before the Independent Companies had 
returned from Norway.21 This evidence continues to suggest that Britain was prepared for 
offensive operations and considering the previously documented failure of the Independent 
Companies, it may be suggested an immediate replacement was needed. Evidence in 
support of this from 9th June 1940, the day before all of the Independent Companies’ 
returned from Scotland, document Major-General Laycock receiving the following letter from 
the War Office: 
'Volunteers for Special Service 
 
1. It is proposed to raise and train a special force of volunteers for independent mobile 
operations 
2. You are required to collect the names of up to 40 officers and 1000 other ranks in 
our command, who volunteer for this special service and whom you consider 
suitable for it. 
3. Volunteers will be employed on fighting duties only, and Commanding Officers id 
be assured will require only the best type of Officers and men... Officers and 
 
18 Commando: a Boer journal of the Boer War, ed. D. Reitz (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1929), pp19 
see Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 1/3, Volunteers for Special Service 9th June 1940 
19 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Brigadier Laycock, Early History: The Origin and Work of the 
Combined Operations see also National Archives PRO WO 218/19, Notes on the Re-Organization of Special 
Service Brigade 
20 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Account of 'Independent Companies' by Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor  
21 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Early History, Interview with Colonel Dudley-Clarke see also The 
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 1/3, Volunteers for Special Service 9 June. 1940. 
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men who are approved for the force will be taken off the strength of their units and 
trained in the United Kingdom. Individuals are not likely to remain in the force for 
more than a few months.'22 
Firstly, it must be noted that the term 'Special Service' was used instead of 'Commando' 
which evidence from Colonel Dudley Clarke states as 'scarcely an appropriate title to appear in 
the formal nomenclature of the Ministry...'23 The two terms 'Special Service' and 
'Commando' are to be used interchangeably and represent the same unit throughout this 
study. The linguistic parallels between the above document and the discussions of the 
General Staff with regard to the Independent Companies held on 4th April 1940 are strikingly 
similar.24 As with the Independent Companies' the Commandos also required only the 'best type 
of men' for 'independent mobile operations.'25 Evidence to suggest that measures had been taken 
to improve the equipment and training for the Commandos could not be found for the purpose of 
this argument. However, official records show that the Independent Companies had not yet 
returned from Norway, thus making improvements in equipment and training unlikely.26 
Additionally the evidence documents the fragility of the Commando organization, shown by 
the War Office stating that service would only be for a 'few months'.27 The implication that the 
Commandos were temporary may have been an attempt to convince Battalions to send their best 
men, because as Major-General Lund stated Commanding Officers unhappily, 'lost their best 
men' to the Commandos.28 In support of Major-General Lund's point, for example, the Officer 
Commanding 1st Battalion Scots 
22 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 1/3, Volunteers for Special Service 9 June. 1940. 
23 Seven Assignments, ed. Colonel Dudley Clarke, (London: John Cape, 1948), pp 219 
24 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 1/3, Volunteers for Special Service 9 June. 1940. see 
also National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization of 
special infantry battalion see Appendix I 
25 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 1/3, Volunteers for Special Service 9 June. 1940. 
26 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 1/3, Volunteers for Special Service 9 June. 1940. see 
also C. Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, (London: Grafton Books, 1991), pp25 see also National Archives 
PRO DEFE 2/699, 'No 1 Independent Company' Interview with Captain McLean of the R. A. M. C 
27 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 1/3, Volunteers for Special Service 9 June. 1940. 
28 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Major-General O. M. Lund, D. S. O, R. A. (M. G. R. A. at H. F.), 
Interview 8 May. 1942. • 
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Guards, in reply to the recruitment of his men to the Commandos, as early as 18th July 1940, 
wrote: 
'In accordance with instructions received from Lieut. Col. Commanding Scots 
Guards, who states that he is not prepared to send any more Officers and that he was not 
in a position to spare other ranks. In view of existing commitments a NIL return is 
rendered.'29 
This correspondence was sent five and half weeks after the original request for Special 
Service Volunteers, indicating the potential lack of support from Commanding Officers very 
early in the Commando recruitment process.30 To gather a further understanding of the 
problems of recruitment and the high calibre of men that the Commandos were seeking to 
recruit, it is beneficial to analyse the recruitment form of Officers wishing to join the 
Commandos in June 1940.31 
No secondary source analysis with regard to the specifics of the application process has been 
found for the purpose of this study. On the other hand, Major General Laycock archived 
documentation showing the Special Service application of Officers and Other Ranks to the 
Commandos and to what was known originally as the 'Special Service'.32 This is of interest from 
a research perspective because it documents those who thought themselves Commando material 
and also demonstrates the qualities the Commandos required.33 The questions asked are a 
combination of commonly asked questions (name, date of birth, nationality) while other 
questions suggested that men were applying for something out of the ordinary and about 
which the 'Special Service Training Instructions' would go onto state: 
29 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 1/3, Letter replying to 'Volunteers for Special Service' 
from Officer Commanding 1st Battalion The Scots Guards, 18 July. 1940. 
30 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 1/3, The War Office, 9" June. 1940, Letter Addresses to 
Officer Commanding All Companies 1st Battalion Scots. Guards 
31 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 1/1, Application forms for 'Special Service' 1940 
see Appendix VIII 
32 ibid 
33 ibid 
 
 
 
 
'Mental as well as physical alertness. As a general definition: what is required is the 
man who is quick in thought and, quick on his feet. Rather than a man who, though he 
may be exceptionally strong, is slow in his mental reactions and in his movements.'34 
Therefore, in conjunction with evidence from the 'Special Service Training Instructions', 
applicants within the evidence all, in theory, exhibited the qualities of 'mental as well as 
physical alertness.'35 Firstly, a high level of education had been undertaken by all sixty eight 
recruits in the provided material; individuals had attended an established Public School and 
then continued on to Oxbridge. For example, Second Lieutenant J. Griffith-Jones of the 
Coldstrearn Guards had attended Eton from 1923-28 and then followed on to Trinity Hall, 
Cambridge from 1928-31.37 Second Lieutenant Earl Jellicoe of the Coldstream Guards had been 
educated at Winchester for five years and then studied at Trinty Hall, Cambridge for three 
years and Second Lieutenant I. Collins also of the Coldstream Guards had studied at Harrow 
from 1917-22 and then at Magdalen College, Oxford between 1922-25.38 Therefore, the sample 
of Officer Recruits shown here supports the evidence that most Officers were drawn from 
highly educated Oxbridge Graduates.39 
Another focal point of the Special Service applications was a heavy emphasis on an 
individual's involvement and ability to play sports or games to a high level, because as 
Commanding Officer of No 3 Commando, Brigadier Durnford Slater noted, 'a good physique was 
important.'40 Thus, it can be stated from the evidence that a high level of physical fitness was 
demanded from the start of the Commandos' recruitment. In an attempt to source men 
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who would be suited to the exercises early training instructions for the Special Service 
described: 
'Physical fitness and endurance will be an essential element of every operation, not only 
because of the difficulties of the terrain over which the troops may be called upon to 
move, but because great speed in reaching the objective will almost invariably be 
required.'41 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the 'Special Service Application' forms document men with 
strong sporting backgrounds.42 For example, Lieutenant J. Kauntze of the 7th D.evons Territorial 
had played rugby for Cambridge University, Exeter, Harlequins and Devon as well as playing 
squash and golf.43 Lieutenant N. Setten of the 8th Battalion The Devonshire Regiment 
engaged in swimming and had represented the Honourable Artillery Company (HAC) at 
rugby and boxing.44 The evidence further supports the point that applicants had a strong 
sporting background and met the requirements of the 'Special Service Training 
Instructions'.45Similarly, applicants are again asked about their physicality in question sixteen and 
whether they, ride, swim, mountaineer, ski, shoot, run, bicycle long distances and box with 
question twenty again asking if they are 'fit' .46 
As mentioned previously, the above evidence suggests potential Commando Officers were of a 
certain social status and educational background. However, in criticism of the evidence thus 
far, Major-General Laycock's No 8 Commando was known as the 'Blue (blood) 
Commando' due to the upper class background of its recruits, mainly from the London area.47 
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It is, therefore, not surprising that the evidence indicates Oxbridge backgrounds and 
consistent access to what may be considered sports of privilege, such as rugby, golf and 
squash.48 Research supports further the notion of elitism in No 8 Commando, with regard to 
recruitment as Major-General Laycock commented, 'I had a list of volunteers given me, but I did 
not rely on it. I called on my friends whom I could trust …'49 The evidence suggests that 
Major-General Laycock appears to have ignored formal recruitment channels. Additionally it 
cannot be judged whether any of the potential Officers named so far were commissioned, as the 
information as to who was selected was not available for further comparative analysis. The 
recruitment paper evidence is thus highly subjective despite consistent traits of academic 
excellence and sporting prestige, evidence of Major-Generals Laycock's bias and further 
evidence of who was commissioned makes conclusive findings unattainable in this instance. 
However, the Special Service application forms do hold historical value as the Officers 
previously mentioned and the other sixty eight applicants documented in the evidence, 
possessed what were known as, 'emergency commissions' from the Army Reserve.50 As has 
already been documented, the Regular Army quickly stopped its men joining the Commandos 
because it stripped a battalion of its best men.51 Thus, the Commandos had to turn very 
quickly to the Army's Reserve forces to source their recruits.52 To a certain extent, this 
allowed for a consistent supply of men, although none of Reservists document having seen 
active service when asked of their 'Military Experience'.53 For the paperwork to be under the 
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remit of Major-General Laycock meant that the Officers would have been applying to 
become Troop Leaders, with no prior combat experience. The evidence can be deduced in such 
a manner as the only part of Commando selection in which Commanding Officers' took part was 
in the selection of Troop Leaders.54 Therefore, because evidence has suggested that the majority 
of Officer Recruits had no combat experience, research indicates that Commandos valued 
men with operational experience from a very early stage.55 In support of this a letter from the War 
Office on 9th June 1940, to all Battalions concerned with the recruitment of Commandos 
stated, 'Those who have already seen active service are especially valuable'.56 
 
The only exceptions in the archive material with regard to the 'military experience' of 
Officer Recruits were four Royal Marine applicants.57 This research finding is interesting 
because the Royal Marines did not officially assume Commando duties until the formation 
of the Royal Marine Division in February 1942.58 It was suggested by Colonel Pollock in a 
review of the Commando history that the criticisms of recruitment against the Commandos 
could have been subdued if the Royal Marines had adopted raiding duties.59 Evidence from 
the study of 'The  Special Service Applications' suggest that elements of the Royal Marines 
were applying to the Commandos two years earlier than was previously thought, such was 
the need for men.60 
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Lieutenant N. Beal, Royal Marine, applied, having served four months in China and two 
months in South Africa, while aboard HMS Cornwall.61 Lieutenant A. Forrest, Royal 
Marine, had four and a half years' experience, one year as 'Aide de Camp to his Excellency 
the Governor of Queensland' and three years and two months in Palestine.62 Lieutenant G. 
Blake, Royal Marine, had four years' service at sea as a Heavy Armament Control Officer.63 
The military experience of the Royal Marines is evidently far greater than that of the Army 
Reserve Officers previously mentioned.64 However, a comparable analysis of whether this 
made the Royal Marines more successful than the Army Reservists in their application is 
again not possible due to a lack of available evidence. 
Documented below is an example of the list of Officer Recruits that Major-General 
Laycock '...did not rely on.'65 However, this evidence is of value because it distills the 
information from the Special Service recruitment forms into that which the Commandos 
required, which was,'.. .only the best type of officer.'66 
'Lt A. H. Barclay:   He has knowledge of Norwegian and German 
language and can speak Swedish fluently. 
2Lt R. E. Stone (R. A. S. C.):  Age 23. Physical fitness grade 1. Swimmer 
able to drive car, lorry or m/c [motor cycle] 
Capt F. H. Harris (1st n/ Hunts Yeo):  Age 31. Single. Fit. Athletic. Good swimmer; 
does not suffer from seasickness. Able to 
drive wheeled or tracked vehicles. 
Capt W. Williams (R. A. S. C.):      Age 40. Active Service South Africa Bgd 
191867 
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Within this sample, there are a number of traits for which the Commando recruiters were looking. 
As the application form requested, men were to be young and at the peak of their physical fitness.69 
In contrast, Captain W. Williams at the age of forty has no mention of his physicality noted although, 
it may be suggested, because of his operational experience he had been shortlisted.70 Therefore, it may 
be suggested that experience was equal if not favoured over fitness because of the general lack of 
experience amongst recruits. Swimming was a particularly important requirement as was the 
ability to operate a variety of vehicles; this is because of the amphibious mobile nature of the 
Commandos' role.71 
However, in challenging the value of recruitment documents still further, issues with regard to 
historical analysis again become apparent. As Brigadier Dumford-Slater explained of his 
methodology for selecting Officers, 'I wanted cheerful officers, not groaners... I looked for 
intelligence and keenness.'72 To judge whether a recruit was 'cheerful' or whether he was 'keen' 
from the recruitment data available to this study is not possible. Furthermore, the subjectivity 
noted in Major-General Laycock's selection techniques is again apparent with Brigadier 
Durnford-Slater, to say whether someone is 'cheerful' or not is matter for the individual to decide. 
However, evidence from a letter extract from Eastern Command on 12th July 1940 suggests why 
Commanding Officers may have been biased in their selection of Troop Leaders: 
68 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives LAYCOCK 1/2, Volunteers for Commandos (Officers), London Area, 
July 1940. 
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'As soon as the troop  leaders  are  selected they  will  arrange  to  visit 
those aforementioned units as specified by Commando leader from which their 
troops are to be selected and will interview and select other rank personnel.'73 
Thus, the motivation behind Commanding Officers ensuring that Troop Leaders were of the 
required standard was due to the fact that once this process had happened the formation of 
their Commando was taken out of their hands.74 Troop Leaders then selected their own troop, a 
process that was designed to encourage bonds between the men.75 Before the selected 
Officers viewed the men they were privy to reviews of individuals sent from their respective 
Commanding Officer.76 In support of this the following information is from the Officer 
Commanding 1st Battalion Scots Guards, dated July 1940: 
'The following N. C. O.'s and men of the company under my command have 
volunteered for No 8 Commando and are recommended or otherwise shown: 
2695444 Sgt. Kay, W. F.  Strongly recommended 
2692673 L/Sgt. Stone, S.  Strongly recommended, drives car and is 
a mechanic, has seen active service 
2694243 Cpl Wallace, W. Not sufficiently intelligent 
2696266 C/Cpl McDonald, R. No active service experience. Not tough 
enough in my experience. 
2692921 Gdsm Boyd, F.  Not recommended, a good man but too 
old.’77 
 
From the above evidence, it is difficult to determine the choices made by the Officer 
Commanding 1st Battalion the Scots Guards when selecting the above men for Commando 
73 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives LAYCOCK 1/2, Extract from Eastern Command C. R. E. C. No. 
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duties.78 Much of the accusation of poor 'discipline' as suggested by Colonel Pollock was due to 
Commanding Officers offering 'trouble-makers' to the unsuspecting Commandos.79 However, 
as was noted previously, the aforementioned Commanding Officer gave a 'NIL' response to 
requests for men on the 18th July 1940, suggesting that the above-listed men were potentially the 
best soldiers in the 1st Battalion the Scots Guards.80 Therefore, a certain degree of historical 
accuracy can be assumed. The requirements of Other Ranks appears similar to that of the 
Officers, that is, the men who had seen active service appear to be recommended, such as L/Sgt 
Stone whose ability to drive vehicles is also favoured.81 
Therefore, a Commando troop was made up from 'one Captain, two Subalterns and forty 
seven other ranks.'82 Thus, with ten troops in a Commando and thirty six based at 
headquarters, an original Commando was, therefore, five hundred and thirty six at full 
strength.83 What is striking about this, is the high ratio of men to Officers, demonstrating the 
extent to which other ranks were expected to show a high level of intelligence and 
individualism, exhibited in the rejection of Cpl Wallace's application due to him being 'Not 
sufficiently intelligent.'84 On the other hand Guardsman F. Boyd's age is questioned, unlike the 
previously mentioned Capt W. Williams, suggesting that the need to recruit a high quality of 
Officer was greater than within the ranks.85 
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Thus, by July 1940, the following was formed; note the absence of No-1 Commando which 
would eventually be formed when the Independent Companies were disbanded in October 
1940:86 
'No 2 Commando: Specialized parachute unit  
No 3 and No 4 Commandos: Southern Command  
No 5 and No 6 Commandos: Western Command  
No 7 Commando: Eastern Command 
No 8 Commando: Raised from the Household Division and London District but 
serving under Eastern Command 
No 9 and No 11 Commandos: Scottish Command  
No 10 Commando: Northern Command'87 
Recruitment evidence presented in this chapter indicates that the formation of the 
Commandos appears to have gathered pace throughout June and July 1940.88 However, 
evidence suggests a potential lack of support amongst Commanding Officers, leaving a 
shortfall in experienced personnel.89 Despite this, evidence suggests Commandos were being 
established nationwide but, the reality of the Commandos' situation was documented by the of 
Head of Combined Operations, General A. Bourne, suggesting in contrast the Commandos were 
in an embryonic state during these months: 
'I was told that I had available for offensive operations, 6 Independent Companies', 10 
Commandos in the process of being raised, one Infantry Brigade Group, possibly the 
Royal Marine Brigade which was earmarked... and a number of parachutists... In 
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fact what existed at the time, were 350 odd men from the Independent Companies' who 
were drawn from every conceivable source.'90 
General Bourne's comments support the evidence presented in this dissertation thus far, 
demonstrating the difficulties with Commando recruitment.91 The evidence shows that all ten 
Commandos were not operationally ready during June 1940 (the date of General Bourne's 
appointment) due to the problems of experienced Officers and men not being submitted from the 
Regular Army.92 Furthermore, the previous Chapter assessed the confused establishment of the 
Independent Companies, of which some, like Captain McClean's No 1 Independent Company, 
had taken twenty five percent casualties in Norway and from which they had only just returned 
and were still recovering.93 Nevertheless, the Commandos would be sent into action at Boulogne 
on 24th/ 25th June 1940 and at Guernsey on 14th July 1940 and no counter evidence could be found, 
to suggest that these problems had been addressed.94 
Comparisons can be draw from both the establishment and 'deployment of the Independent 
Companies and the Commandos from the evidence available. The Independent Companies were 
formed incredibly quickly: for instance No 1 Independent Company was raised on 22n April 1940 
and moved on 27th/ 28th April 1940.95 Brigadier Durnford-Slater recalls in his memoirs that he 
was appointed Commanding Officer of No 3 Commando on 28th June and 'by 5th July No. 3 
Commando was in existence.'96 In contrast to the Independent Companies' 
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lack of training, the Special Training Centre (STC) for the Commandos was established in June 
1940 at Inverailort Castle, Lochailort, although evidence from Brigadier Durnford-Slater suggests 
that No 3 Commando had no time to attend this training facility because it was based in 
Dartmouth preparing for the raid on Guernsey.97 
The raid on Guernsey was, therefore, conducted with a similar level of preparation to the 
Independent Companies' attack on Norway. For example, the Motor Launch boats (ML's) 
initially headed towards the wrong beach, poor landing techniques resulted in every soldier's 
weapon  becoming  wet  before  the   Commandos  had  reached  the  beach.98  Thus 
the Commandos were in a similar situation to the Independent Companies in Norway, having no 
magazines for their Tommy guns after the Royal Ulsterman had sailed with them on board.99 No 
11 Independent Company failed to make it to Guernsey, with two boats breaking down in the 
Channel, one boat ran into rocks and one boat landed on the Isle of Sark instead of 
Guernsey.100 This is comparable to the Company of Scots Guards who became lost on the 
Norwegian expedition and turned up three weeks later in time to sail back to Britain.101 In 
contrast to the Independent Companies., in Guernsey there was no enemy present, with the 
machine gun nests and barracks which No 3 Commando were assigned to neutralize, being 
empty.102 Had enemy forces of a similar standard to that in Norway been present, the result may 
have been similar to that of the heavy casualties sustained by the Independent Companies in 
Norway, as Brigadier Durnford-Slater described 'a youth in his teens could 
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have done the same.'103 Thus, evidence shows that both forces had not received training and had 
been quickly placed on operational duties, with both consequently showing poor military skills 
with regard to navigation, seamanship and weapons handling. Winston Churchill described 
Guernsey to General Ismay on 23rd July 1940, as a 'fiasco.'104 
Evidence from the raid on Guernsey also exposed the fragility of the recruitment process. 
Previous evidence from Commando selection noted the requirement of men to be 
swimmers.105 This requirement was also communicated in the original letter from the War 
Office to the Commanding Officers in respective battalions stating, 'They should be able to 
swim and be immune to sea sickness.'106 When the men began to return to the beach, the Motor 
Launch boats were unable to come ashore, due to rough conditions.107 Thus, the men had to swim 
out to the Motor Launches.108 On news of this, three men announced they were non-swimmers, 
having lied on their application forms. One of the three men, F. Drain, 'was never a swimmer at 
any time.'109 The three men stayed on Guernsey intending to be picked up the following day.110 
However, these three Commandos were eventually captured by a German patrol and spent the 
rest of the war as prisoners.111 Based on this evidence, it can be suggested that the Commando 
application process may, as early as June 1940, have been allowing men to join who were not of 
the required standard.112 
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In conclusion, the evidence presented suggests the formation of the Commandos arid the 
beginning of a doctrine that required certain physical and mental standards.113 However, in 
contrast to the centralized requirements of the War Office, the recruitment structure was 
independent with regard to each Commando and this appears to have allowed for an amount of 
personal influence and interest on the part of the Officer Commanding,114 As evidence has shown 
the Commandos were devoid of central operational control (War Office) and as Colonel 
Pollock suggested, this brought about a 'lack of any clear perception of how the forces were 
to be organised, trained and employed' which has been documented in the 'fiasco' of the raid 
on Guernsey and a failure to learn the lessons of the Independent Companies in Norway.115 
This is most poignantly described by J. Dunning of No 4 Commando: 
'The Commandos were raised with the purpose- and hope- of immediately sending 
them off on raids across the Channel, and this short-term intention precluded a 
thorough and systematic build-up from individual training to collective and 
amphibious training.'116 
In criticism of J. Dunning comments, there had been a systematic build-up of training 
occurring at the Special Training Centre (STC) at Inverailort Castle, Lochailort, since June 
1940 and this topic will constitute the following chapter.117 
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Chapter Three- Development of the Commandos 
46 
The evidence presented thus far has critiqued the confused efforts of Britain's irregular 
warfare during 1940. The discussion of training and development in Commando doctrine has, so 
far, only been mentioned with regard to developing an argument to demonstrate the 
shortfall in the preparation for operations in Norway and for the raid on Guernsey.1 This 
chapter will critique the training of Commandos through 1940-1941 and seek to look further at 
problems that emerged within the Commandos Units throughout this period. 
The Official Army Record entitled, The Training of the Commandos in Scotland during the Late 
War', documents that the Special Training Centre was established in June 1940 at 
Inverailort Castle, Lochailort, Scotland but fails to explain beyond this.2 Brigadier A. H. 
Homby states that the reason for basic Commando training being situated in Scotland was due to 
the fact that 'Portsmouth was getting a bit too hot to be comfortable.'3 In contrast Colonel F. 
Spencer Chapman's memoir, The Jungle is Neutral, provides a detailed account of how the 
Special Training Centre at Lochailort was formed.4 Colonel Chapman states that a secret 
operation to sabotage the Norwegian coast had embarked in May 1940.5 However, the 
submarine had been depth-charged in the North Sea and the men had had to return to Britain.6 The 
three men on board the submarine, B. Mayfield second in command of 5th Scots Guards I Ski 
Battalion, referenced in Chapter One, J. Gavin, a Company Commander in 5th Scots (Guards 
Ski Battalion and B. Stirling had returned to Stirling's family home at Lochailort to 
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recover. 7 Consequently, due to the fact that 5th Scots Guards Ski Battalion had been 
disbanded in March because of the poor skill of recruits under arctic conditions, the three men 
had decided to start the Special Training Centre at Stirling's home, to train men in 
'smash-and-grab' raids because:8 . 
' ...the hills and valleys of Inveraray, the flatter countryside of Ayrshire, the Isle of 
Bute and the Shores of the Fifth of Clyde became practice grounds for the battles of 
Africa, Sicily and Italy, and later for D-day and North West Europe'9 
The above source documents the geographical benefits of the west of Scotland, where 'hills and 
Valleys' would make for strenuous physical training and the 'Firth of Clyde' would be perfect 
for practicing amphibious landings.10 The choice of geography relates to evidence from the 
'General Objectives of Training' that outlined, 'Irregular warfare demands the highest 
standards of initiative, mental alertness and physical fitness together with the maximum 
skills at arms'; thus a diverse and experienced training team was assembled to meet these 
requirements.11 In response to the requirements of training, Official Army Records show the 
following men creating the first training team: 
'Surgeon Commander Murray Levick, R. N., who was with Scott at the South Pole; 
Major Jim Gavin, R. E., the Everest Climber; Major Scott, R. A., who was with Gino 
Watkins in the Arctic; Capt. Edward Chapman, Scots Gds., the famous Bisley 
Marksman; and Capt. Annand, V. C., D. L. I.'12 
The above source documents the Commandos' emphasis on the training team's endurance 
background; the above men are arctic explorers or climbers used to harsh conditions as 
evidence from the 'General Objectives of Training' which stated, '...endurance will be 
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essential elements of every operation...'13 Unfortunately, other than Major J. Gavin who was 
previously mentioned, information to suggest the exact means by which these men came to be 
involved with the Commandos could not be located. However, in his memoir on 
Commando training, J. Dunning of No 4 Commando recounts a training structure from the 
Special Training Centre, Lochailort that documents the syllabus for military skills: 
'...field craft (directed by Lord Lovat), demolitions (Mike Calvert), close-quarter 
combat (Fairbairh and Sykes), weapon training (Wally Wallbridge) and the signals 
wing organized by Peter Fleming, famous author, explorer and brother of lan 
Fleming, the post-war creator of 007 Bond'14 
On analysis of the above evidence, it may be suggested that the Special Training Centre was 
looking to amend the problems of the Independent Companies' and Commandos' early 
actions: poor navigation, weapons handling and communication.15 Thus, in relation to 'The 
General Objectives of Training', field craft and signals training was to prepare the 
Commandos for the fact that they 'may frequently be called upon to act on their own without 
outside assistance...'16 Furthermore, "The General Objectives of Training' with regard to 
demolition and weapons training also state, 'it cannot be stressed too strongly that everyman 
must be conversant with and skilled in every weapon with which the Battalion is armed.'17 
Therefore, comparative evidence documents the links between the syllabus of skills taught at 
13 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 2/3, Special Service Brigade: Training 
Instructions, The General Objectives of Training, 1940 
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the Special Training Centre (STC) in trying to achieve 'The General Objectives of Training'18 
J. Dunning's evidence does not, however, state that sniping and stalking was taught by a 
group called Ghillies, who based their training on stalking deer, as research from the Army 
Records, 'The Training of the Commandos in Scotland during the Late War' indicates.19 The 
Ghillies (part of the Lovat Scouts) were famed for their sharpshooting capability and these men 
'proved highly successful in imparting their patience and knowledge to soldiers who had never 
seen deer before in their lives except perhaps in the London Zoo.'20 In further support of this the 
'Commando Training Instructions No1' states that Commandos were to develop a '...hunter's 
cunning.'21 
Furthermore, the addition of 'close-quarter combat' to the training schedule demonstrates a 
refinement of the Commandos' 'purpose' which as Commando Training Instructions Nol' 
states was to '....operate independently...'22 Thus, the instruction of Martial Arts allowed the 
Commandos to deal with 'circumstances which may be entirely different to those which were 
anticipated' and which aimed to achieve the 'capability to operate independently for 24 
hours', as stated in the main aims of 'The Employment of the Commandos.'23 The nature of 
Commando 'smash and grab' operations also necessitated the need to get within close 
proximity of the enemy.24 As Sergeant J. Huntington notes in his memoirs, 'Queensbury 
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Rules' no longer applied against the enemy they were fighting.23 Further research shows that the 
two men who were recruited to found the Commando unarmed fighting skills section were 
Captains Sykes and Fairbairn and their suitability stemmed from their service in the Shanghai 
Police and the latter's foundation of the Shanghai Riot Squad.26 J. Dunning additionally 
claims that Fairbaim was the 'first foreigner outside of Japan to be awarded the Black Belt degree 
by the Kodokan Ju-jitsu University of Tokyo.'27 
Applied to the Commando training process was what became known as Returned to Unit 
(RTU) if a recruit did not make the grade.28 This process allowed not only for the setting of an 
elite standard, but also for the immediate removal of weakness, as J. Dunning of No 4 
Commando explained, a 'system of selective culling was a prerequisite to the maintenance of the 
highest standards of military efficiency.'29 Primary sources such as J. Dunning's assume that 
RTU originated with the Commandos with research of secondary sources offering no 
contradictory evidence to suggest otherwise.30 However, research shows that 'RTU' was first used 
with regard to irregular units in the Unit Diary of 5th Scots Guard Ski Battalion on 29th February 
1940, when ninety six of the four hundred and sixty applicants were rejected.31 This evidence 
further demonstrates the lessons Majors Mayfield, Gavin and Stirling learnt from 
25 Commando Veterans Association, The Memories of Sergeant John Huntington as related to John Mewett 
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their time in 5 Scots Guards Ski Battalion and it appears that this system was used at the 
Special Training Centre, Lochailort.32 A great number of recruits dropped out because of the high 
physical standards required, as Captain T. Hughes, 47 Commando, Royal Marines explains: 
'... it was a bit rough at times, but you were expected to be able to do anything and to be 
honest, I think there was a certain amount of over expectation at times.'33 
'Over expectation' manifested itself in speed marching which involved marching at pace 
across large distances in full kit.34 Captain T. Hughes recalls that these marches tended to be 
around 'eight miles'; however. Official Army Records state that one of the training staffs 
favourite routes was to 'retrace the steps of Bonnie Prince Charles on his way to the coast from 
Glenfinnan.35 The skill of speed marching was practiced so that the Commandos could cover 
great distances, quickly, by foot, supported by evidence from "The General Objectives of 
Training' which stated, 'because of the difficulties of terrain over which the troops may be called 
upon to move...' and 'great speed in reaching the objective will almost invariably be required.'36 
Statistics from the Official records of Commando deaths between May 1941 and June 1945 
document one hundred and ninety eight Army Commando Officers and eight hundred and 
twenty five Other Ranks were killed.37 Of these deaths seventeen were during training with 
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twelve incidents of drowning.38 Although the evidence does not give specific detail as to how the 
twelve recruits drowned, it may be suggested that even until 1945, men who were not strong 
enough swimmers were either lying on their application form or being allowed to join regardless 
of the risks as discussed in Chapter Two.39 
Independence and initiative was not only encouraged during training but also in established 
Commando Units. This was shown by the introduction of billets to Commando life, a stark 
contrast to the culture of Regular Army barracks.40 This was documented by the 'General 
Objectives of Training' which stated: 
'No Special Service Battalion, or any part of one, can feel confident of success unless all 
ranks are capable of thinking for themselves; of thinking quickly and of acting 
independently...'41 
There is more to be evaluated from evidence of the fiscal dimensions of Commando service, with 
Officers being given 13s 4d a day and Other Ranks being given 6s 8d a day to sustain 
themselves.42 The allowance was expected to cover the following: 
'(i) Ration Allowance 
(ii) Accommodation 
(iii) Fuel and Light 
(iv) Field Allowance (Officers and W. O.'s if applicable) 
(v) Upkeep of plain clothes, (other ranks) 
(vi) Travelling expenses in connection with training 
(vii) Servant Allowance (Officers) 
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(viii) Kit Allowance (Other Ranks)'43 
This functional and administrative innovation allowed for the Commandos to avoid the 
domestic requirements of barracks that J. Dunning suggested diverted around twenty per cent of a 
battalion's strength per day.44 As the above source indicates, each individual was to manage 
his own rations and accommodation, this allowed for a huge amount of administration to be 
removed from the Commandos as a unit.45 This is supported by evidence from the 'Commando 
Training Instruction No. 1' that suggested barrack life led men, 'not to learn to look after 
themselves.'46 As evidence from James Dunning memoir continues to explain: 
'...clearly this situation [barracks] imposed considerable limitations on training and 
progress towards optimum fighting efficiency. But worse still, these irksome and 
tedious 'necessities' not only sapped morale they also stifled initiative.'47 
Evidence to contest J. Dunning's claims that billeting was purely beneficial to the 
Commandos can be presented. Captain T. Hughes recalls the gamble of selecting a billet, 'If you 
were fortunate you found nice people to stay with. There were many advantages one way or 
another'.48 There were advantages to living in billets, as T. Sherman, No 2 Commando, recounts: 
'I found a magnificent billet in Ayr. They still had servants and my friend and I 
ended up having our boots cleaned and when we were going on exercise we were 
given game pie and very exotic bag rations'49 
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Evidence shows that having one's boots cleaned and rations prepared, may not have been the 
process of 'initiative' and 'discipline' that Commanding Officers had in mind from 
billeting.50 The issue of 'discipline' is regularly propounded in the essays and correspondence of 
Major-General Laycock, as he stated, 'I do not believe that I myself fully realized the 
paramount importance of discipline in those early Commando days...'51 Research indicates that 
Major-General Laycock recognized that the lack of operational activity the Commandos were 
experiencing, combined with the domestic freedom of billets was leading to discipline issues.52 
Evidence to support this can be noted in the instructions on the 'Points of Discipline' sent to 
Officers of each Special Service Battalion during December 1940: 
'I realise and understand the psychological effects of bringing people to a state of 
excitement and anticipation and then pricking this bubble. On the other hand 
advantages and privileges do exist, barrack guards- daily fatigues and the petty 
restrictions of barrack life do not have their being in anything like the same degree. 
Neither is it appreciated that the degree of comfort hi which the majority have lived this 
summer is in quite a different category to that which has been enjoyed by most 
battalions.'53 
Major-General Laycock's comments suggest that the Commandos may have become spoilt and 
unappreciative of their life styles, but as previous evidence has shown, billeting could have its 
advantages.54 
A compounding factor in the issue of discipline was the amalgamation of the Independent 
Companies and Commandos into five Special Service Battalions in October 1940.55 Evidence 
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from a War Office paper by the Commander of Special Service Battalion, Brigadier J. C. 
Haydon states that, 'Special Service Battalions started their careers under distinctly 
unfavourable psychological conditions.'36 This structural shift from Brigade to Battalion was an 
attempt to solve control problems but further evidence from Brigadier Haydon explains that 
this produced a '...most difficult body to control or to knit into a cohesive whole.'57 
Supporting evidence shows that Major-General Laycock viewed this move as making the 
issue of discipline worse. Commenting on the new Special Service Battalion's organization, he 
stated, "These wholly uncontrollable units each of 20 sub-units comprised of 72 officers and 
over 1,000 other ranks...'59 Major-General Laycock, therefore, became responsible, as 
Commanding Officer, for both No 3 and No 8 Commando under1 No 4 Special Service 
Battalion.60 How disruptive this structural change was is open to debate as the Special 
Service Battalion was disbanded in March 1941 and in a paper entitled 'Commando Training' 
from 10th January 1942, Major-General Laycock described the- Commandos as still being an 
'undisciplined rabble', evidence that suggests that little in his opinion had changed.61 
Additionally, Major-General Laycock's claims of the Commandos persisting in their lack of 
discipline can be supported by evidence documenting the Commandos social lives.62 The 
material which supports this is contained mainly in Commando Unit diaries and suggests that 
some of the Commandos' behaviour may have been anti-social.63 Due to a lack of military 
operations the Commandos socialized in the clubs and bars of the holiday towns in which 
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they were stationed.64 However, research suggests the less desirable, but somewhat 
predictable, product of regular socializing and drinking was violence.65 This appears to have 
happened with some frequency as the Diary of No'2 Commando, written by Lieutenant 
Colonel Newman, exhibits the contrasting fortunes of his Commando, and the on-going 
struggle that Officers had with controlling unoccupied troops:66 
'3rd October 1941- A quiet day that ended up in a famous night. A party of SS 
(Special Service) visited the York House Dance Hall and a fight ensued between 
Commando men and Poles. No person seems to have started the fun- but people here 
voted the fracas highly successful. Chairs and unfortunately knives were used as 
missiles, and one Pte soldier was knifed in the back and had to receive hospital 
treatment. It appears the Commando knowledge of unarmed combat was practised.l67 
This source provides evidence as late as October 1941, of the social difficulties the 
Commandos were encountering in the face of operations being cancelled at the last moment. In 
this instance, even the Commanding Officer, recounts the 'fun' of the fight and how 
'successful' it was, despite one of his own soldiers being knifed.68 The strict pursuit of 
'discipline' that had been shown in the evidence from Major-General Laycock, was evidently not 
felt across all Commandos and amongst all Commanding Officers, further demonstrating 
Colonel Pollock's suggestion of the Commando's problem of 'operational control.'69 The 
opportunity to exhibit the skills of unarmed combat appear to have outweighed all other 
consequences.70 However, the diary evidence documents Lieutenant Colonel Newman losing his 
enthusiasm, when the Commandos' thirst for action continues into the following evening: 
'4 October 1941- The Commando and local Police were rather concerned about the 
previous night's incidents. It was arranged to picket the town at night and put the 
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dance hall out of bounds. In spite these precautions 2 SS men beat up Polish Soldiers in a 
chip shop and had to be taken to hospital. As a result of this one man received 28 days' 
detention and was RTU. 
10th October 1941- Various incidents of an unsatisfactory nature took place in a 
Dance Hall where a civilian was injured'73 
The Unit Diary entries of No 2 Commando, therefore, present a pattern of violence on 
successive weekends, with Colonel Newman documenting another fight the following 
weekend (18th October 1941).72 The extent of the seriousness of this violence is indicated by 
Colonel Newman documenting the establishment of a 'picket' and that the men were banned 
from the dance hall and this implies that many Commandos must have been involved.73 On the 
other hand, there was little opportunity for entertainment in wartime Britain, as Captain T. 
Hughes explained, 'there were occasional radio programmes that you might have heard but 
there was nothing to do... So boredom was quite a serious matter...'74 The evidence of the 
behaviour of all Commando Units between 1940-41 was not possible to collate due to time and 
resource constraints on visits to the National Archives, Kew. Nevertheless, evidence suggests 
that Major-General Laycock viewed anti-social behaviour in December 1940, as seriously 
harming training and discipline, commenting: 
'...now turn to another on which I harp continually because I am convinced of its 
vital importance and necessity...! consider that discipline is lax. Drunkenness is 
common. It is without doubt the cause of many other offences... People are not fit, 
either physically or mentally!'75 
It may be suggested from this evidence that by December 1940, within Major-General 
Laycock's, No 4 Special Service Battalion (No 3 and No 8 Commando), drunkenness was 
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widespread as is comparable to evidence from the Unit Diary of No 2 Commando.76 
Research suggests that 'Discipline' was an important element in creating effective 
Commandos.77 In support of this Major-General Laycock published a number of documents and 
essays with regard to the subject of 'Discipline'.78 Furthermore, the evidence of the actions of 
No 2 Commando mentioned in their Unit Diary pinpoints the main source of the problem of 
'discipline' within the Commandos as 'toughness', as Major-General Laycock stated:  
'There was a misconception of the term "toughness". A certain type of both Officers and 
men thought they were "tough" if they looked tough. We explained it took years to make 
a soldier, whereas any fool could learn to be a gangster in a few weeks'79 
As evidence throughout this dissertation has suggested, both Independent Companies and 
Commandos had been established in a matter of weeks in 1940 and it is, therefore, not 
surprising that the time scales suggested by Major-General Laycock had not been available to 
create high quality soldiers.80 In response, each unit began a process of 'progressive' training with 
'eradication of the unfit' one of its primary objectives.81 Therefore, training was not confined 
to the Special Training Centre, Lochailort through 1940-41, because of a lack of operations 
and a need to keep the men 'tough'.82 Unlike the Regular Army, each Commando Unit and the 
Officers within it, were responsible for formulating their own training as there 
76 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 2/3, Major-General Laycock, Points of Discipline and 
Training Lecture, Dec. 1940 see also National Archives PRO DEFE 2/37, No 2 Commando Unit Diary 
77 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 2/3, Major-General Laycock, Points of Discipline 'and Training 
Lecture, Dec. 1940. see also The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 2/1, Major-General Laycock, 
Discipline, 1932 
78 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 2/1, Major-Gcncral Laycock, Discipline 
79 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 2/3, Commando Training, 10 Jan. 1942. see also National 
Archives PRO DEFE 2/699, Reorganization of the Commandos 
80 National Archives PRO WO 260/32, Record of meeting held on 4 April. 1940. to consider the organization of special 
infantry battalion see Appendix I see also Commando: Memoirs of a Fighting Commando in World War Two, ed. Brigadier 
J. Dumford-Slater (London: Greenhill Books, 2002), pp 15 
81 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 2/3, Commando Training, 10 Jan. 1942. 
82 National Archives PRO DEFE 2/1134, The Training of Commandos in Scotland during the Late War, 4 Oct. 1945. see also 
The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 2/3, Commando Training, 10 Jan. 1942. see also National 
Archives PRO CAB 106/7, Colonel Pollock, Commando Group 
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was no single training initiative.83 This is supported by the 'Commando Training Instructions No 
1.' issued on the 15th August 1940 which outlines requirements, for example, of 'Silence and 
Secrecy' without explaining how these requirements were to be achieved.84 Furthermore, 'Regular 
Training' is documented most weeks in the Unit Diary of No 2 Commando, with each 
Commando responsible for its own training and development with information only being 
exchanged between Officers when circumstances permitted; this is further evidence of the 
administrative restrictions within the early Commando organization.85 
According to J. Dunning of No 4 Commando, the majority of early training lists compiled by 
Commanding Officers have failed to survive and in relation to this study no such primary 
documents were found.86 Although, Dunning has seen one list that did survive, written by 
Colonel Newman of No 2 Commando which he has recounted from memory (see Appendix X).87 
On the evidence provided by Dunning it would appear from comparative analysis that 
Commando Unit's training was based on the doctrine instilled during basic training. 
Comparison between the initial training directive to the Special Service Brigade from the War 
Office, and point four of Colonel Newman's training directive, document very similar training 
requirements: 
Special Service Brigade Training Instructions: 
'Physical fitness and endurance will be an essential element of every operation, not only 
because of the difficulties of the terrain over which the troops may be called 
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upon to move, but because great speed in reaching the objective will almost 
invariably be required.'89 
Colonel Newman No 2 Commando, Training Directive: 
'Physically. The highest state of physical fitness must at all times be maintained. All 
ranks are trained to cover at great speed any type of ground for distances of five to 
seven miles in fighting order.'90 
These two strikingly similar documents indicate that the 'embryonic' structure of the 
Commandos, suggested by Colonel Pollock, was not so diverse.91 The similarities between the 
two directives show that the lessons from the Special Training Centre, Lochailort may suggest 
that they were being used as a template and being carried through into active Commando 
Units.92 Colonel Newman's training directive looks also to build upon the skills of unarmed 
combat (point 6), demolitions (point 11), signals (point 10) and field craft (point 14), four key 
areas of the syllabus previously mentioned that were taught at Special Training Centre, 
Lochailort.93 Thus, there may have been more cohesion between individual Commandos 
than was previously suggested. 
Evidence to suggest the further cohesive effect that training had is found in the emphasis on 
competition within and between Commandos.94 Evidence from the 'Special Service Brigade: 
Training Instructions' suggests Commandos should compete in 'Map Reading', 'Forced 
Marches', 'Climbing' and 'Football and Boxing'.95 However, further evidence reveals that 
competition via training developed far beyond the basic training skills suggested by the War 
89 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 2/3, Special Service Brigade: Training 
Instructions 
90 The British Commando: The Origins and Special Training of an Elite Unit, ed. J. Dunning (Colorado: Paladin 
Press, 2000), pp35, see Appendix 'C' 
91 National Archives PRO CAB 106/7, Colonel Pollock, Commando Group 
92The British Commando: The Origins and Special Training of an Elite Unit, ed. J. Dunning (Colorado: Paladin 
Press, 2000), pp34-36 see also National Archives PRO DEFE 2/1134, The Training of Commandos in Scotland 
during the Late War, 4 Oct. 1945. 
93 The British Commando: The Origins and Special Training of an Elite Unit, ed. J. Dunning (Colorado: Paladin 
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94 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 2/3, Special Service Brigade: Training 
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Office.  The 'Inter-Commando' training exercise (see Appendix XI) is evidence of the scale on 
which elaborate training exercises were being undertaken.97 
Evidence from the 'Inter-Commando' training exercise brief for 7th- 8th July 1941, between No 2 
and No 9 Commando firstly documents the resources and manpower available for training 
suggesting the Commandos' lack of combat activity stretching into 1941.98 Furthermore, it may be 
noted that three Officers from each of No 4 and No 12 Commando are also listed as present, once 
more demonstrating the growing level of co-operation between individual Commandos.9 The 
Commandos' progression from individual or section based training, to 'Inter-Commando Training' 
exhibits not only the importance of competition but also the value gained in training together.100 As 
the brief shows these sophisticated exercises took place over many square miles, as the 
grid-references of rendezvous, rivers and frontiers document.101 However, the aims of the 
'Inter-Commando Training Exercise' were to 'practise patrolling and watchfulness' and 'practise the 
maintenance of a Commando in the Field for a period of 24 hours or more' are evidence of the 
changing role of the Commando in 1941.102 The initial role of the Commandos was to 'raid' not to 
'patrol' and, as the War Office stated, to have a 'capability to operate independently for 24 hours' 
and not in excess of this time frame.103 In contrast, as the training brief suggests, the 
'Inter-Commando Training 
96 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 2/3, Special Service Brigade: Training, 
Instructions 
97 National Archives PRO WO 218/19, Inter- Commando Training Exercise (7-8 July 1941) between No 2. And 
9 Commando see Appendix XI 
98 ibid 
99 ibid    
100 ibid 
101 ibid, 
102 ibid 
103The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 1/3, War Office 1940,The Employment of 
Commandos see also National Archives PRO WO 218/19, Inter- Commando Training Exercise (7th-8th July 
1941) between No 2. And 9 Commando see Appendix XI 
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Exercise' was to take place over a three day period, a role far more suited to the Regular 
Army.104 
Additionally, 'Inter-Commando Training Exercise' appears to have encompassed elements 
beyond the Commandos themselves, with the brief also circulated to Officers from the Royal 
Navy, Royal Marine Division and Royal Air Force.105 This is evidence of the Commandos' 
integration into Combined Operations which was seen by the Government as the main way that 
're-entry in the continent of Europe' could be achieved. 10 
As Brigadier A. H. Hornby wrote, 'The winter of 1940-1941 was a chapter of disappointments. 
Raid after raid was planned and none of them came off...'107 Research suggests that one of the 
reasons why raids were cancelled or postponed in 1940 was still due to a lack of training, despite 
the establishment of the Special Training Centre, Lochailort. This is supported by evidence 
from a War Office paper by Brigadier J. C. Haydon, who stated that Commandos were being 
taken with 'only eight weeks training behind them' but a Commando was not ready for operations 
for 'four to five months.'108 Therefore, despite the evidence documented earlier hi this Chapter, 
Britain was still struggling to produce 
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Commandos capable of fulfilling the 'smash and grab' role that the 'Commando Training 
Instructions Nol.' outlined in August 1940.109 
Raids that did occur, such as the raid on the Lofoten Islands on 4th March 1941, turned into a 
publicity stunt rather than a military operation.110 Evidence to support this over a year and a half 
after the raid is documented in the Unit Diary of No 1 Commando from 23rd October 1942, 
'Allied Newspapers were persuaded not to publish an article... giving a fictitious account of 
the Lofoten Raid...> i n  For the media still to be interested in the raid after so long shows just how 
little operational activity the Commandos were experiencing throughout 1942. 
Consequently, the Commandos were given ever larger operational tasks, with No 7, 8 and 11 
Commandos deploying to the Middle East under Major-General Laycock, known as 
LAYFORCE in February 1941.112 This mass role, however,-was not what the Commandos had 
been designed for as Colonel Pollock wrote, 'a Commando possessed no close support 
weapons and no administrative organization for its own maintenance in the field.'113 In 
support of this Major-General Laycock wrote to H. Q. LAYFORCE on 1st May 1941, 
'...considerable administrative difficulties are constantly experienced' and on disbandment of 
LAYFORCE wrote of'... the shortage of manpower.. ,'114 In this role critics claimed that the 
Commandos' role 'could have been better done by a unit of the Field Army' as General Paget 
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stated.115 Due to the failure of LAYFORCE, Churchill informed the Chiefs of Staff that the 
Commandos had been '...frittered away. ..'116 N. Cherry's, Striking Back: Britain's Airborne and 
Commando Raids 1940-42, concludes his study in 1942 because it is claimed that '...at this 
point the use of these troops as "raiders" virtually stopped.'117 
Conversely, sometime after 1942 research shows that the Commandos were still deployed on 
raiding duties.118 Evidence from Lord Louis Mountbatten on 15th June 19435 shows the 
Americans questioning the 'number of raids carried out...', as the document states over 
twenty raids had been mounted and thirty six were being planned since the Dieppe Raid in 
August 1942.119 Further evidence to support the continuation of a 'raiding' strategy even at the 
end of the War can be seen in the large volume of raids listed in a War Office paper from 1945 (see 
Appendix XII).120 
The evidence suggests, therefore, not that the Commandos-stopped their 'raiding' role but that 
Britain was no longer a 'guerrilla' nation, as Colonel Dudley Clarke had envisaged in 1940 
and 1941.m The support of America allowed for both raiding and a more general 
employment of the Commandos due to the increase in equipment, specifically ships. Lord 
Louis Mountbatten documents that between December 1941 and June 1943 the number of 
Landing Ships increased from twenty two to one hundred and thirteen and Landing Craft 
from five hundred and nine to three thousand and seventy nine.122 The mobility and 
115 National Archives PRO CAB 106/7, Colonel Pollock, Commando Group 
116 National Archives PRO TREM 3/330/9, Churchill letter to C. O. S.-, 7 Oct. 1942. 
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capability of the Commandos, therefore, greatly increased and, thus, operations in North 
Africa and Sicily were not unsurprising. 
In conclusion to this Chapter, it can be suggested that the introduction of America and Russia as 
Britain's allies by the end of 1941 effectively alleviated the isolationism from which the 
Commando 'spirit' had been born. Evidence presented in this Chapter shows that Britain 
never successfully used its Independent Companies or Commandos through 1940-1941, as 
Dudley Clarke originally envisaged.123 As this study has argued, a lack of inter-war planning and a 
rushed formulation consequently meant the Commandos struggled to address a cohesive 
training doctrine and organization and this may have impeded their ability to fulfil their 
envisaged role. 
123 National Archives PRO. DEFE 2/699, Brigadier Laycock, Early History: The Origin and Work of the Commandos 
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Conclusion 
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In conclusion, this research study has followed the line of enquiry originally outlined in the 
Introduction, providing critical and comparative analysis of the establishment and development 
of the Commandos from 1940-1941 based on original research. A summary and assessment of the 
academic outcomes of this research project will now evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. 
Firstly, the study of secondary sources from which the research project was identified, was the 
cause of some research difficulties. As discussed in the Introduction, academic study of irregular 
warfare from the Second World War is extensive and this, theoretically, resulted in a great many 
potential research opportunities. Initially, a study of an entire Special Force was to constitute 
this thesis, specifically 40 Commando, Royal Marines. However, research revealed a large 
volume of secondary source material with regard to the Royal Marines and this made the 
location of a valid and original research opportunity difficult. With regard to this, a research trip 
to the Royal Marines Archives at the Royal Marines Museum, Southsea was conducted in an 
attempt to identify a research topic through the primary source material located there. Yet again, 
little in the way of academic opportunity presented itself and the material that was collated 
has had no impact on this study. However, the assistance of Matthew Little, the Royal Marines 
Archive Curator was greatly appreciated. 
In contrast, the decision to undertake a research project focusing on the Army Commandos 
from 1940-1941, was made after research into the secondary sources revealed a lack of 
academic attention to this particular area in the historiography. Research suggested that J. 
Ladd's, Commandos and Rangers of World War II, and, C. Messenger's, The Commandos 
1940-1946, were the only two secondary sources that attempted to address the Commando's 
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establishment and development during 1940-1941.l This offered an academic opportunity to 
contribute to the historiography and this is shown from the learning outcomes of this research 
project. Research into, and critical analysis of, 5th Scots Guards Ski Battalion and the 
Independent Companies provided evidence of their contribution to the establishment and 
development of the Commandos and illustrated how Britain was unprepared for irregular 
warfare.2 The study of 5th Scots Guards Ski Battalion and the Independent Companies further 
contributed to the historiography as research suggested that there was no published material 
specifically on either of these formations. 
The critique of the original application forms of the Commandos in 1940 allowed for a close 
investigation, thus enabling this thesis to document the shortcomings of the original 
Commando organization. This research was of value because it provided credible evidence that 
exposed deficiencies in a broad spectrum of the recruitment processes.3 Research also 
demonstrated the Commandos' failure to effectively deploy in the 'smash and grab' role 
originally envisaged for them in 1940.4 This dissertation's research outcomes, as far as could be 
discerned, were not critiqued at any great length in any published secondary source and thus 
contribute to the historiography. 
However, in criticism of the research approach, it was thought that a great deal of detailed 
material with regard to the Commandos from 1940-1941 would reside at the National 
Archives, Kew, although, as was found to be the case, almost no training information from the 
focus period was available from that location. For example, all that resided in the National 
Archives, Kew regarding Commando training from 1940-1941 was a small three 
1 J. D. Ladd, Commandos and Rangers of World War II, (London: Macdonalds and Jane, 1978) see also C. 
Messenger, The Commandos 1940-1946, (London: Grafton Books, 1991) 
2 National Archives PRO WO 166/4110, Formation of 5th Battalion Scots Guards see Appendix HI 
3 The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, LAYCOCK 1/1, Application forms for 'Special Service' 1940 
see Appendix VIII 
4 National Archives PRO WO 33/1669, Commando Training Instruction No1, 15. Aug. 1940, see Appendix II 
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page pamphlet titled, 'Commando Training Instructions Nol' from 1940 (see Appendix II).5 
Research at the National Archives, Kew into Commando Unit Diaries attempted to 
compensate for this but, for the most part, little more than brief comments were gleaned from the 
diary entries.6 However, a substantial amount of primary research material was sourced from the 
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London.7 Furthermore, a great deal of 
supporting evidence with regard to training was obtained from J. Dunning's, The British 
Commando: The Origins and Special Training of an Elite Unit, and this primary published 
work supplemented archival research.8 Thus, a possible further line of enquiry with regard to the 
development of training during this period could potentially constitute further lines of enquiry. 
On further analysis of the research approach, alternative conclusions could have been drawn if 
more consistent visits to the National Archives, Kew or the Liddell Hart Centre for Military 
Archives, King's College, London had been possible. However, the research time that was 
allocated to these establishments received a stringent process of document prioritisation in 
preparation for the visits, so that the maximum benefit could be derived. 
Access to some of the published primary sources also required visits to the British Library, 
London as some texts are no longer in print, for example, Colonel Dudley Clarke's, Seven 
Assignments, and this further limited access to primary data for logistical reasons.9 It is 
acknowledged that access to a greater number of primary published sources would have 
allowed for more research opportunities and potentially added greater value to this 
dissertation. However, a great deal of value was derived from published primary source that 
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was obtained for research purposes, such as, Brigadier Durnford-Slater's, Commando: 
Memoirs of a Fighting Commando in World War Two.10 The shortfall in published primary 
source material is evidence of the difficulties involved in creating an original research project 
focused on this part of the Commandos' development, where the individual Commando Units 
were encouraged to be ' as loose as possible...'11 
It is also acknowledged that certain aspects of the Commandos' establishment and 
development .through 1940-1941 has not been addressed in any great detail. Most prominent in 
this respect was the Commandos' role in Combined Operations; however, this topic was 
thought to be so expansive as to be detrimental to the focus of this dissertation. Examples of 
literature that address the issues of Combined Operations can be found in B. Fergusson's, The 
Watery Maze, and a book published by the War Office, The History of Combined Operations 
1940-1945, and again this area could constitute a further line of research enquiry/2 
The oral history provided in an interview conducted with Captain T. Hughes, 47 Commando, 
Royal Marines has also had little impact on the evidence and arguments presented in this 
research project.13 Again, this is due to the fact that much of the information obtained was 
associated with Royal Marines. The decision to conduct a research project which focused on the 
Army Commandos from 1940-1941, had already been finalised and was in the process of being 
researched when the opportunity to interview Captain T. Hughes presented itself. The prospect of 
conducting an interview with Captain T. Hughes could not be turned down, because of the 
chance to gain experience in interview techniques and also due to the fact that valuable research 
material might have been obtained. Only small elements of Captain T. 
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Hughes's interview were used as evidence, mostly in relation to topics that transcended all 
elements of the Commandos, for example, billeting. In criticism of the interview technique, 
information regarding the Army Commandos and their association with Royal Marine 
Commandos of which Captain T. Hughes was a member should been investigated. 
Furthermore, even if Captain T. Hughes was not involved with the Army Commandos 
during 1940-1941, some form of research evidence may have been derived that was of 
academic value. However, this interview would still be of great value to a thesis focusing on 
a similar line of enquiry to this dissertation but concentrating on the Royal Marines 
Commando, 1943-1945.14 
The research project has, therefore, made some strong contributions to the historiography 
whilst also recognizing that both the aims of the project and a certain degree of restriction to 
archive material have influenced the research findings and presented further areas for 
potential academic study. Furthermore, the learning outcomes of conducting an original 
research project have been academically testing, presenting alternative methods and 
requirements of study. It is hoped the endeavours of this research study are represented in 
both the strength of evidence and the argument underpinning this assessment of the 
establishment and development of the Second World War Commando. 
14 Captain Trevor Hughes, (2010) Discussion of 47 Commando Royal Marines, [Interview], Rotherham, Thomas Lea, 
11 /07/2010 see Appendix IX 
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I, TREVOR L HUGHES, MBE 
 
[PRINT NAME] 
Hereby give Thomas Lea permission to use the interview given on the 18th July 2010 in relation to and 
accordnace with his research dissertation for his MA Military History being studied at Chester University 
2009/2010. 
Signed:- 
Transcript- Interview with Captain Trevor Hughes MBE, 47 Commando, Royal Marines, held on 
the 18th July 2010:- 
Me- Hi Trevor could you just tell me who you served with? 
Trevor-I was with 47 Commando Royal Marines from the beginning, so 1940 until they 
were disbanded. I thought I would get these out for you, these are my medals including 
the MBE. 
Me- Wow, my Granddad left me his medals when he past away, this is the defence star 
isn't it? 
Trevor- Yes that is correct. 
Me- My Granddad also has the Italy and the Africa stars. 
Trevor- These bring a back a few memories, I haven't had them out for a while, I thought 
you might like to look at them. 
Me- Do you still have your Fairburn Sykes Commando Dagger? 
Trevor- No one of my lads has it, ummm yes that's right lan's got it. Now this is also not 
my original berry. 
Me- What happened to your original? 
Trevor- The lads used it for scouting, so it got a bit tatty, so now I have this brand new 
berry 
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Me- So how did you end up serving with the Royal Marines? Were already serving, or did 
you join up during the war? 
Trevor- No I was too young to be in the services when war broke out. Thinking back I 
would have been called up in the very late part of 1940, maybe early 1941.1 had already 
joined the Home Guard locally, ummm and I had learnt the basics of drill, which is very 
good in the home guard actually. I had been invited to join by a pal of my Fathers, but he 
lived on the other side of Chester from where I lived. So I used to bicycle three miles each 
way, most of the time with a rifle slung over my back, of course we didn't drive cars back 
in those days. So when I did go to the Marines I had the advantage that I already knew 
some drill, even though it was an Army drill, the Marines did something different. I went 
with one advantage, enormously, if you were in something like the Territorial Army or the 
Home Guard, you kept your uniform and went in your uniform rather than being fitted out 
when you got their. So I arrived in the uniform which was very impressive. There were 
thirty... yes about thiry odd people in this... well it was an advanced training cadre, which 
if you had a matriculation, which in those days was something you didn't automatically 
get, that meant you had been to a grammar school. By the time 1 was sixteen and a half, 1 
had qualified and been given an open scholar ship to Oxford, which you couldn't go to 
until you were eighteen. 
Anyway, I would have been called up, so with some help from some pals I volunteered 
[for the Commandos] and because 1 went in uniform, 1 didn't have the right cap on but 
anyway. I got an advantage over most people, so instead of doing the usual twelve weeks 
on the parade ground, I did only six weeks. So I was sent from near Topsham in Devon, the 
Marines are still their now, and I was sent to Thurstone Hotel which was the Royal 
Marines Military School. Absolutely beautiful place to be and 1 have been back many 
times since incidentally, we have often been down that way camping or caravanning. 
Anyway, 1 managed to get there and I did very well, although I arrived halfway through a 
course, I still managed to finish all that was necessary in the course and I was discharged 
at the end of it with a Second Lieutenants rank. But you had a basic uniform, battle dress, 
you know the kind am talking about? 
Me- Yes there called Combat 95's now. 
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Trevor- Well we were required to have an Officers kaki service dress so we could look 
decent. But it cost twenty three pounds! 
Me- What is that equivalent to today? 
Trevor- Oh a good thousand pounds I should think. Well I had about two and six pence, 
luckily I managed to get in a que for a telephone box outside the Thurlstone Hotel. I got 
through to my Farther and he said 'Oh I will have a word with your Grandpa and we will 
see what can be done anyway and commit yourself to whatever you have to we can 
manage twenty five quid between us'. The next morning in a first class mail, which 
wouldn't happen these days, a cheque arrived for fifty pounds, signed by a bloke I know 
all too well called Don Duncan from the Linden Bank in Dale Street, Liverpool. It had 
just a little scribbled note on a card, saying 'your Father asked me to send this' and at the 
same time 'you have an account number 1234567 and if you need a bit more don't 
hesitate to sign a cheque or two.' He sent me about another four cheques and a cheque 
book in the post. Now this was brilliant and it wasn't until I got back after the War, many 
years after, and I went to see my Grandfather and said 'what are you doing on Friday' 
and I said 'well nothing Grandpa', well he said 'I have had a word with your father and 
your coming into our Masonic Lodge'. Now they had been in many years and I knew 
nothing about it, now am a very senior Free Mason and I have been all over the place. 
When I got to the lodge, the Secretary of the Lodge was waiting for me and his name Don 
Duncan and you realise then its not what you know its who you know. Bloody 
marvellous it really was, but that's an odd little story on its own 
Me- So when you decided to volunteer was that influenced by anything in particular? 
You read panic over a German invasion and German Paratroops being dropped into 
Britain 
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dressed as nuns and butchers. 
Trevor- [Laughter] No they were looking for volunteers and I had the requisite 
knowledge from the Home Guard and the local Captain of the Home Guard said 'oh yes I 
will put your name forward'. I got in immediately without any effort at all and the first 
thing I knew there was a train ticket waiting for me to take me from Chester to Exeter 
and then on to Topsham. It only took a couple of days, obviously I didn't know they were 
short of people. So yeh then it was sixteen weeks and I was commissioned and I never 
really looked back. I was posted then to a Royal Marine Battalion who were to go and 
invade the Azores somewhere around Portugal. I was 
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then sent to a place near Christchurch, Hampshire to do what turned out to be Landing 
Craft Training and then that got me sent to Scotland to do some advanced training. But 
then the Portuguese realised they were going to lose the Azores so they gave up and we 
just moved in, thank God. Because I was already in the Mobile Company, there were 
already three Army Commandos, oh and there was one other 10 Inter-allied Commando, 
which consisted of a bunch of Norwegians and all sorts of other foreigners. It was then 
decided that the expansion of Commandos couldn't possibly be done by training, training, 
training more and more men, it would simply take too long. So they already had these 
Royal Marine Battalions so almost overnight they transformed them into Royal Marine 
Commando units, getting rid of a lot of people in mean time. 
Me-Were a lot of men Return to Unit (RTU)? 
Trevor- Yeh, there was nothing wrong with them, they just weren't fit enough. We 
therefore became the founders in 1942. There were No 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and then 
47, never found out why they chose those numbers. And so everything moved on from 
there. 
Me- There was a lot of argument over Royal Marines becoming Commandos at one point, 
do you remember anything about that? 
Trevor- Well yes they were already at sea a lot of them. They couldn't reduce any of the 
Royal Marine detachments on any of the boats, big boats especially, cruisers and above, 
because the Marines used to man one of the turrets, they would man X turret out of A, B, Q 
and X. They already did water training it was part of the job so they eventually had to be 
chosen. 
Me- So what was training like, you hear of fake grave stones being put outside of the 
gates? 
Trevor- Certainly, I haven't been back since, were fairly well trained already, but we had 
no idea of what was waiting for us there. I had never speed marched until I got there and 
that was the first day. We did speed marching very nearly everyday, it was only eight miles 
usually, but in full battle order in about two hours. The Commando memorial at Spean 
Bridge near Achnacarry is one of my favourite places now. When 
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ever I go up to Scotland on holiday I like to go and have a little look. Yeh it was a bit rough 
at times, but you were expected to be able to do anything and to be honest I think there was 
a certain amount of over expectation at times. But D- Day and particularly the attack on 
Port-en-Bessin was quite something., we lost a lot of people. 
Me- Did the training make you feel like you were prepared for action, did it make you feel 
ready? 
Trevor- Oh yes, if you didn't have the right attitude there was no point in joining the 
bloody thing. The one thing that we aren't is aggressive, the British are not aggressive by 
nature, but the one thing we had to be was aggressive. We were issued with, and I had up 
until about, oh say twenty years ago, I still had my original Colt .45 automatic, but 
everybody got very uptight about private guns, so it ended up in a river. It was the only 
sensible thing to do, it was a river in Scotland. Yeh we had a fairly rough time until the 1st 
November 44' and that was really it, the invasion of Walcheren. Now we went in a full 
gale, in an ordinary LCA Landing Craft from Oostende all along the Belgium coast, you 
couldn't go out, you had to stay with five hundred yards of the shore. Then they cleared the 
mine field and we shot across the shelf, but by god it was rough and people were... no wait 
am quite wrong we didn't go in LCA's there we went on a Landing Ship, the Belgium Mail 
Steamer Josephine, which had Landing Craft hanging from its galleys. We had practiced 
in and around Scotland and we eventually in the middle of the night in a full gale, got in to 
these bloody things and they were seriously in danger of sinking and we lost umpteen 
people on the way into shore. 
Me- So if you fell in the weight of the equipment you were carrying would drown you? 
Trevor- Oh yes, if you ended up in the water you didn't have a chance, we were wearing 
blow-up Mae West's, but we were carrying all of our ammunition with us, everybody from 
officers down to the few cooks and people like that we had we had with us, everybody 
loaded to the gunnels with ammunition. Particularly 'Mills Bombs', which were not big 
but if you put half a dozen around you they are bloody heavy an don't stay together. 
Anyway we got ashore and the Germans were in concrete emplacements in massive sand 
dunes all the way down to the shelf. And I am talking about massive, they were two 
hundred and fifty feet high, however we got them out eventually, we shot a lot of them and 
then we liberated Middelburg the town. There were more Dutch traitors in Middelburg 
than anywhere else and all the Dutch were shooting their own people so then we were 
busy stopping the Dutch 
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shooting their own people ohh bloody hell. It was just one of those things, you just had to 
do it it was a job you had to do. Then I had the adventure of a life time, a week before the 
crossing of the shelf they discovered they didn't have enough Airborne people. I had been 
to Hum Airport which is along side Bournemouth and they had been doing parachute 
training. Parachute training consisted of being let up in a balloon and jumping out of 
basket from about seven hundred or eight hundred feet. Jumping out the basket was no 
trouble but landing on the bloody floor was the problem, oh god it was hard. But I 
managed it and I got parachute wings, which I never wore. 
Me- Why not? 
Trevor- Because we were warned that the Paras were always short of recruits, they were 
subject to too many accidents. It turned out after we had done the invasion and capture 
Port-en-Bessin, Montgomery came to review the Commando and what was left of another 
one, near Bayeux. And there was a bloke going down following him, very aimiable saying 
'Sir are you alright Sir' and the bloke was coming down and taking the notes of people 
with parachute wings on their shoulders, just, 'oh you name please?', 'Jones', 'Thank you', 
and in the end about twenty or more were suddenly wisked away and 'oh your going 
parachute jumping'. By this time I had become a troop officer of the headquarter troop, 
because early on in the war I had been sent to, just as I was commissioned, I was sent to 
Saundersfoot in South Wales. Well up on top of the hill by the harbour is the Saundersfoot 
Hotel, which was the Royal Marines Signals School for the war. So I was sent there and I 
thought, this is a bloody good job to have, all we did was half a days signal training, all it 
was- de dar dar dar de de darr dar [laughs]. I can do Morse now in my sleep, course you 
had a maximum range of about two miles on a number eight set. Anyway, I went down 
there and I was very fortunate to be down and I was posted from there to 47 because they 
were short of a signals officer. I eventually became Headquarters Troop Commander, but 
in the mean time I had had four weeks at Catterick on a Royals Signals course, which was 
completely useless because I was the last four weeks of a twelve week course. But hey it 
was nothing more than a bit of luck and a bit of a laugh and there was a lot of nice girls in 
Catterick so that was about it. 
Me- They found that Signals became a very prevalent thing didn't it, when they 
realised the need for communication in a raiding part. 
Trevor- Well it was astonishing, it really was, because we lost a lot of communications 
on D-day and were, if this was us going ashore on D-day [Trevor 
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pushes his figure up a table mat], Port-en-Bessin was seven miles away, half 
between us and the Americans coming ashore here [Trevor points to the right of the 
mat]. Port-en-Bessin stuck out into the sea, have you ever been to Whitby? 
 
 
Me- Yes 
Trevor- Just like Whiby sticks out into the sea Port-en-Bessin stuck out into the sea and it 
was vital that it wasn't damaged, because they were bringing PLUTO under there, 'Pipe 
Line Under The Ocean', from Southampton. There was an oil refinery set up there and 
they needed the place undamaged so they could get it ashore in a safe harbour. So we 
attacked it from inland, that's where those photo graphs were taken in actual fact when we 
went back there, so we captured it form inland without causing any damage. Either side of 
Port-en-Bissen were big coastal cliffs and the cliffs were full of German batteries all 
facing out to sea and our job was'to get those batteries from inland. So we dropped down 
there and we did that quite well. 
Me- So you must have been trained as quite an advanced climber then after all the training? 
Trevor- Well yes, but to be honest this was nothing more than a steep pass and when the 
first dozen people got up their I started shooting seriously at everyone. The Germans just 
came out, bang. Really I was quite astonished, well they weren't really German Army 
troops they were locals who had been drafted in and told to get on with the job. 
Me- So what was your relationship say with the Army Commandos, you hear of a lot of 
rivalry between the Army and Royal Marine Commandos? 
Trevor- No, we never met, you never got within a hundred mile of another Commando, it 
was just one of those things. The only excitement I had was really ummmm gone. We did 
two raids just after we finished training, we went to New Haven oh the South Coast and 
did two raids from New Haven on Fecamp. Direct raids on the beach in the dark, I only 
went on one of them and the intention was to pick up the first two or three Germans we 
could get hold of who would be out on foot patrol. We found some down the beach and 
there turned out to be about half a dozen of them, they were all Flemish, Dutch they had 
been forced into service and they were 
124 
delighted, 'oh yes Sir', they could speak a little English as well. But we had several 
Dutchman with us no they weren't they were Belgium's who were bilingual. We weren't 
ashore for no more than twenty to twenty five minutes, something like that and then back 
again. It was rough stuff and we were in more danger from the weather than we were from 
the Germans really or from mines on the beach. Mines were bastards because you 
couldn't... you couldn't detect them. You could if you took a bloody great big sweeper 
with you . 
Me-1 guess you didn't have time for all that business 
Trevor- No you didn't, but I suppose that was about it. It was an exciting time, but nothing 
compared to the 1st November gales going onto Walcheren and then crossing of the shelf s 
well that was only killing Germans. We kept going until the end of the war and then by 
the end of it we found ourselves on the North German coast, where was it Danzig or 
somewhere like that. The greatest surprise of all was getting to Germany and we thought 
the Dutch were pretty badly off, there was a lot of emaciated looking people. Then we got 
to bloody Germany and know one could stand up. Thin, haggard, didn't matter what they 
were police men, officers, they had been pretty much starved into submission I should 
thin,. I was delighted, bastard Germans. Although, I have done a lot of business with them 
throughout my business career and I have been to the Hanover Fair with a..... we were 
selling various items but I never got round to thinking anything of Germans, they were just 
a bastard nuisance. So other than that, that's the story. 
Me- I have been down to Kings College London recently and have read a lot of Major 
General Laycock's documents and he seems to place an a lot of emphasis on and worry 
about not so raiding but not getting to go on a raid and the problems with moral and 
discipline When there's nothing to do 
Trevor- Yes, hanging about do nothing. 
Me- Did you witness any of this? 
Trevor- Oh yes, terrible boredom, in the mobile company, waiting for the invasion, this 
is long before D-day, waiting for the invasion of the Portuguese territories. We were 
just in Bournemouth, billeted in private housed, who didn't want us, but they 
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had no options and our parade ground was just the street. We would try and pass time, 
•bloody hell, we couldn't take anything on to the sea and if you attempted to go speed 
marching there was some poor old fellow in a horse and cart in front of you or some of the 
traffic that was still running. Bearing in mind there wasn't all that much on the road but 
you would get a bus that was restricted to fifteen miles an hour, oohhhh god. I think the 
sense of being under a constant obligation to go somewhere, there were some exciting bits 
in the middle. About thirty, thirty-five of us were, incidentally Doc Foresith who is 
mentioned on that news letter I gave you. We went to the Orkneys, now this was a foreign 
country virtually and we went to the Orkney's because there was some thought that there 
was going to be an invasion led from Norway. 
Me- Around Narvik where the early Independent company raids were? 
Trevor- Yes, come across from there and there was a danger 'that somebody, we never 
knew exactly who, would cease the Orkneys because there was a big problem with the 
bloody Russians. Now theoretically they were on our side, but all they were looking for 
was, what can we get out of this? So yeh, we went to the Orkneys, well we had a super 
time up there, about five or six weeks I suppose. We were treated like royalty, they were 
delighted to see us. I had never been to the Orkneys and neither had many of the people in 
actual fact and then in-between times we spent two days on Shetland. Now Shetland was 
completely uninhabited or virtually and we went there to really search out whether there 
were any spies or find out what we could do, there were a few police people there but very 
very few. Anyway that was in-between times, so, before the end of 43', winter time 43' and 
the only reason we were there we had just been up in Scotland anyway so umm. 
Me- So what about the billets you mentioned previously? You all stayed in just normal 
houses with an allowance and you were told to go and find yourself somewhere to stay. 
Was that beneficial or would you have preferred to have been in barracks?      ' 
Trevor- [Shruggs his shoulders] 
Me- So it didn't make any difference at then? 
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Trevor- If you were fortunate you found nice people to stay with. There were many 
advantages one way or another but you didn't hear people say 'I was sat in front of the 
television last night bored to tears'. There wasn't any, there were occasional radio 
programmes that you might of heard but there was nothing to do. Where as I now spend 
my time doing The Telegraph cross word you couldn't get a Telegraph, in many parts of 
the country they weren't available. So boredom was quite a serious matter, but we had an 
adventurous time, going across there [Orkney/Shetland Islands]. I quite enjoyed the 
Shetland bit. We did a raid on Norway and I didn't get within ten miles of the coast. No one 
every told us why we just turned around and came back. We were on an LCV, Landing 
Craft Vehicle in those days. 
Me- So was that a disappointment more than anything, a feeling that you had wasted your 
time? 
Trevor- No not really it was all very enjoyable. More to the point we were on a ship with 
Naval Officers who had a Mess. As an Officer I could live in their Mess [Trevor imitates a 
drinking motion] 
Me- Drinking then? 
Trevor- Well yes, they hardly paid anything for their stuff, so there were things that got 
away [laughter] 
Me- So did you involve yourself in any activities prior to the War that prepared you for 
any of the activities that you had to undergo hi the Commandos? 
Trevor-1 was at school in Liverpool at a Grammar School, an old fashioned Grammar 
School. Where as nowadays a teacher dare not been seen out .with a boy, we had wonderful 
teachers who took us on marvellous weekends and marvellous holidays. And we used to 
drive up in an Austin 7, three of us with our kit, with a guy called Gus Burdenson who 
taught geography nominally when he was really a graduate of English literature and 
finished up as a professor of English literature at the University of Winnipeg. He went on 
the last boat to cross the Atlantic at the end of the war. No reason for it that was just when 
he was booked to go. Yeh we had a lot of wonderful tours all around Buttermere, Red 
Pike, High Stile, High Crag, Great Gable, Green Gable, Skidor 
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Me- So that set you up well for the speed marching then? 
Trevor- Absolutely right, bloody marvellous and when we went to Achnacarry I could 
wizz up bloody Helvellyn without any effort at all. Now a lot of people found it very 
difficult. I was not all that good at speed marching but I have no idea why just quite a few 
fellas were faster than me that was all. 
Me- Did you feel at the time that you were involved in something revolutionary 
cutting edge training for the time? 
Trevor- Umm [shruggs his shoulder] to be honest I enjoyed the actual parade ground stuff, 
I really did. It was wonderful though going back to Achnacarry and being call 'Sir', 'Yes 
Sir over there Sir', 'what can I get for you Sir?', bloody marvellous. 
Hey it didn't really matter as long as you got the right numbers. So what exactly are you 
studying at university? 
Me-I am doing a Masters in Military History. 
Trevor- Ah well, its no effort to talk about. 
Me- Yen I really enjoy it, I think to be honest in my generation, well its not as bad I as it 
used to be, partly because of the expose that current wars have given to the forces. But I 
think there is a huge under appreciation of peoples sacrifices in the past. 
Trevor- Its true, but then it was no different with our generation in terms of the First 
World War. Nothing was ever said about it, my Father certainly never talked about it. It 
may as well have not happened it was talked about so little. 
Me- There's a fella who writes in The Times called Colonel Kemp and he stated that 
three hundred and twenty one people have died in Afghanistan so far and then went 
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or 
on to say that those numbers used to occur every day in World War 2. Three 
hundred odd blokes lost their lives every day. 
 
 
Trevor- Yes, there was a list published every day, which I got as the Headquarters 
Troop Commander and you could only go so far down. But you didn't look at the 
names, you looked at the units they were with. Thinking oh gosh they will be 
wanting some men. 
 
 
Me- So how did looking at all those names everyday make you feel? 
 
 
Trevor- [Shruggs his shoulders] Survive, a totally wrong attitude really, sympathy 
up until a point but. Well my names not on that list so... 
 
 
Me- So what about your supply of equipment? You here of the original Independent 
Companies being hugely underequipped. I heard of a one Major in an Independent 
Company who had to plan a raid on Norway with a holiday brochure as his guide. 
 
 
Trevor- No we were very well equipped I have to say. I got sent on a Bren Carrier 
course so I could learn how to carry a Bren. I went there for oh, am not sure how 
long it was I went there for three weeks. The Carrier was super manoeuvrable , but 
the problem was getting in to it. It had high armoured sides and the engine was at the 
back and you drove it from the front on the right hand side. Now nearly everything 
was being drive from the left in those days and there was an armoured plated front 
that you could just about see over. The seat had about three different driving 
positions so you could either drive without being able to see anything or you could 
drive with the possibility of being shot. So yeh, that was at Keswick. a four week 
driving course for a Bren Carrier in one of my favourite places. And we were hi the 
Derwentwater Hotel, there is an Officers Mess, yeh so I was very fortunate. 
 
 
Me- So if you could describe your War in a couple of words what would you say. 
Would it be words or excitement, regret... ? 
 
 
 
Trevor- One word- lucky. Of course there was an awful lot of blokes who weren't. I 
had a bullet skim my small finger on my left had, I have a piece of shrapnel in my 
left arm, my left leg got blown up but they did a good job putting it back to gather  
again. 
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Worst of all, I was luckily in one of the Commandos that wore helmets, some 
fellows just wore there berets in action. A bullet entered the top of my helmet at an 
angle so it .just scraped the top of my head and entered out the back of my helmet, 
very lucky. It sounds like a terrible thing to say, but the war came at just the time for 
me. I can say I had a marvellous time and I got a decent set of medals from it. 
 
 
Me- Thank you so much for talking to me Trevor its been a great experience 
 
 
Trevor- No problem at all. 
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